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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Under contemporary practice, a state prisoner who has exhausted his avenues of appeal in the state court system may
continue to litigate the validity of his conviction or sentence by
applying for habeas corpus in a federal district court. In the
habeas corpus proceeding, the prisoner may raise and secure a
redetermination of the same claims of federal right that have
already been fully litigated and rejected at the multiple levels of
adjudication and review in the state court system. In practical
effect, this procedure places federal trial judges in the position
of reviewing courts, with authority to overturn the considered
judgments of state courts of appeals and state supreme courts in
criminal cases.
An intelligent assessment of this review jurisdiction must start
from a clear understanding of the fact that the contemporary
"writ of habeas corpus" by which the lower federal courts review
state judgments is not the Great Writ of the Constitution and
the common law. Rather, it is a purely statutory remedy that is
fundamentally different from the traditional habeas corpus remedy whose suspension is prohibited by the Constitution. The
emergence of this nonconstitutional remedy as the basis for a
quasi-appellate jurisdiction of the lower federal courts in state
criminal cases is essentially the result of judicial innovations
that have taken place since the 1950s. In Justice Powell's words,
the result of this development is that we now have a system of
review that "assures no end to the litigation of a criminal conviction," a system that "is viewed with disbelief by lawyers and
judges in other countries."
This Report carries out a review of the historical development
of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction; examines its contemporary character and operation; and discusses relevant policy considerations. The Report concludes that federal habeas corpus as
a post-conviction remedy for state prisoners should be abolished
or limited as far as possible. The limited reform proposals that
were passed by the Senate in 1984 and that are currently before
Congress as Title II of the proposed Criminal Justice Reform
Act provide the best immediate prospect for improvement.
In greater detail, the main findings and recommendations of
the Report are as follows:
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HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS

The right to habeas corpus as understood at common law and
by the framers of the Constitution was essentially a right to judicial protection against unlawful executive detention. A person
who had been taken into custody by executive authorities could
apply to a court to issue a writ of habeas corpus which would
direct the custodian to produce the prisoner and state the cause
of his commitment. If the government made an adequate return
stating that the petitioner was being held on a criminal charge,
the court could set bail for the petitioner in cases where bail was
legally authorized, and otherwise would allow him to remain in
detention pending trial. If the government could state no legal
ground for the detention, the court would order his release.
Thus, habeas corpus in its traditional character was essentially a pretrial remedy which guarded against executive oppression. It could not be used to challenge a person's incarceration
pursuant to the judgment of a court unless the judgment was
void because the court lacked jurisdiction.
The Constitution's prohibition of suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus was intended to perpetuate habeas corpus in its
traditional character as a check on lawless incarceration by executive authorities. The right to habeas corpus under the Constitution and under the First Judiciary Act, enacted in 1789, was
also only a limitation on the power of the federal government,
and had no application to persons detained or incarcerated pursuant to state authority.
In 1867, Congress created an enlarged statutory habeas corpus
remedy-not confined to federal prisoners-to provide a federal
remedy for former slaves who were being held in involuntary
servitude in violation of the recently enacted thirteenth amendment. The remedy under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 was
initially applied in a manner consistent with the traditional nature of habeas corpus; it could generally not be used to challenge
imprisonment pursuant to the judgment of a competent tribunal. Following Moore v. Dempsey in 1923, a somewhat broader
approach emerged in the decisions under which relief on federal
habeas corpus could be available if no meaningful process existed in the state courts for considering a prisoner's federal
claims. Finally, innovative judicial decisions of the 1950s and
1960s effectively transformed federal habeas corpus into a general appellate jurisdiction of the lower federal courts over state
criminal judgments by eliminating the conventional limitations
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on the scope and availability of habeas corpus review and drastically expanding the federal rights of state defendants.
Legislative changes in federal habeas corpus since 1867 have
generally been directed to restricting its availability to prisoners
in state or local custody. For example, Congress has barred access to federal habeas corpus for persons convicted in the local
court system of the District of Columbia; created a presumption
of correctness for state court fact-finding in habeas corpus proceedings; and enacted a rule that unreasonably delayed petitions
can be dismissed in certain circumstances.
Congress has also given partial approval on a number of occasions to more far-reaching reforms. In 1956, and again in 1958,
the House of Representatives passed legislation proposed by the
Judicial Conference that would have virtually eliminated federal
habeas corpus for state prisoners. In 1968, legislation that would
have abolished federal habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy for state prisoners reached the Senate floor as part of the
proposed Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. In 1984,
the Senate passed by a vote of 67 to 9 legislation supported by
the Administration that would create a time limit for habeas
corpus applications, narrow the standard of review for previously adjudicated claims, and effect a number of other important reforms. These proposals are currently before Congress as
Title II of the proposed Criminal Justice Reform Act.
II.

THE CURRENT JURISDICTION

Habeas corpus applications by state prisoners were a relatively rare occurrence prior to the creation of a quasi-appellate
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction by judicial decisions of the
1950s and 1960s. However, they now constitute a major category
of federal litigation. In 1941, state prisoners filed 127 habeas
corpus petitions in the federal district courts. In 1961, the corresponding figure was 1,020. In 1987, it was 9,542.
More detailed statistical information is available from an extensive empirical study of habeas corpus litigation that was
funded by the Department of Justice and completed in 1979.
The study indicated that habeas corpus litigation entails substantial burdens for judges and state authorities, but rarely results in the granting of relief to the petitioner. There is no reason to believe that a "better" result is obtained in any objective
sense in the small proportion of cases in which the federal
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habeas court does reach a different conclusion from the state
courts.
The study also indicated that most habeas corpus petitioners
had been convicted of serious, violent offenses. Over 80% had
been convicted after trial and about the same percentage had
had or were having direct appellate review of their cases in the
state system. About 45% had pursued collateral remedies in the
state courts and over 30% had filed at least one previous federal
petition. Thus, federal habeas corpus typically serves to provide
additional review for prisoners whose cases have already received an abundance of judicial process in comparison with the
average criminal case.
The 1979 study also found extraordinary delays in habeas
corpus filings in comparison with normal appellate mechanisms.
About 40% of petitions in the study were filed more than five
years after conviction and nearly a third were filed more than
ten years after conviction. Delays of up to more than fifty years
from conviction were noted in some cases in the study.
The problem of delay is particularly acute in capital cases,
which are characterized by interminable litigation and re-litigation that impede the execution of death sentences. Thirty-seven
states authorize capital punishment and about 2,000 prisoners
are currently under sentence of death, but fewer than a hundred
executions have occurred in the past twenty years. The federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction provides an avenue for obstruction
and delay in these cases which the state legislatures are powerless to address.
The Supreme Court in its current habeas corpus decisions has
given weight to considerations of finality and federalism that
were ignored or shrugged off in the expansive decisions of the
1960s. A number of significant limitations have resulted. For example, McMann v. Richardson in 1970 and Tollett v. Henderson
in 1973 narrowed the range of claims that can be raised on
habeas corpus by prisoners who have pled guilty. Wainwright v.
Sykes in 1977 restricted the raising of claims in federal habeas
corpus proceedings that were not properly raised before the
state courts. Stone v. Powell in 1976 barred consideration of
fourth amendment exclusionary rule claims by federal habeas
courts where state proceedings provide a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate such claims. Sumner v. Mata in 1981 strengthened the interpretation and application of the statutory presumption in favor of deference by federal habeas courts to the
factual determinations of state courts.
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III. CONSIDERATIONS OF POLICY
Various contemporary features of the federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction reflect a failure of the standards and procedures associated with federal habeas corpus to keep pace with its expanding scope. This expansion has come about almost entirely
through judicial innovation, without legislative sanction. No legislature would pass a law stating that a defendant has a right to
appeal his conviction, but that he may wait as long as he wishes
before doing so. No legislature would pass a law stating that a
defendant may appeal again and again if dissatisfied with the
results the first time around. No legislature would pass a law
stating that a defendant has a right to further mandatory review
of a nearly unlimited range of alleged procedural errors that
have already been thoroughly considered and rejected by other
courts of appeals. Yet all of these characteristics can be found in
the current federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.
Proposals for correcting these anomalies are frequently met
with the fallacious contention that doing so would interfere with
the Great Writ of the common law, whose suspension is prohibited by the Constitution. Contentions of this sort reflect a simple
verbal confusion. The common law writ referred to in the Constitution and the contemporary statutory writ by which the
lower federal courts review state judgments are not the same.
The constitutional "writ of habeas corpus" is a remedy that federal prisoners can use before trial to test the existence of
grounds for detention by executive authorities. The current statutory "writ of habeas corpus" is a remedy that state prisoners
can use after trial and exhaustion of state appellate remedies to
secure additional review of the judgments of state courts. These
two writs have fundamentally different functions and are directed against the actions of different governments. They have
nothing in common but a name.
Various other arguments have been offered in support of the
current system of review of state judgments by the lower federal
courts through "habeas corpus." On examination, these arguments generally conceal a one-sided concern with defense interests-and a correlative disregard of competing public interests
and constitutional values-or an unjustified preference for aggrandizing the lower federal courts at the expense of the state
judiciaries, or some combination of these two biases. Both history and contemporary practice refute the notion that defendants in state proceedings must routinely have access to a fed-
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eral forum for the adjudication of their federal claims. The
argument that habeas corpus review promotes increased fidelity
to the Constitution or furthers the interests of justice is also unpersuasive. The notion that habeas corpus litigation provides a
beneficial type of "recreational therapy" for prisoners ignores
the fact that frivolous and harassing litigation is itself a seriously antisocial activity, and disregards its potential effect of increasing the arrogance of unrepentant criminals.
IV. REFORM OPTIONS

In 1983, Attorney General William French Smith suggested
that the optimum solution to the problems of the federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction would be the enactment of legislation abolishing federal habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy for
state prisoners. We agree. A reform of this sort would not affect
in any manner the traditional writ of habeas corpus whose suspension is prohibited by the Constitution and would not upset
any deep-seated tradition or historically sanctioned practice.
State convicts would retain the right to seek direct review of
their cases by the Supreme Court following such a reform, in
addition to having access to the appellate and collateral review
mechanisms provided in the state court systems. The same reform has already been in effect for close to twenty years in the
District of Columbia, with no discernible adverse effect on the
quality or fairness of criminal proceedings.
A second possibility would be to limit federal habeas corpus to
the role of a backstop remedy, whose availability would be conditioned on a state judicial system's failure to provide some
meaningful process for raising and deciding a federal claim. This
would also constitute a fundamental improvement over the
pointless redundancy of the current system.
A final legislative option is limited reform measures focusing
on particular problems of abuse or excess that arise under the
current system of review. This approach is taken in the reform
legislation that was passed by the Senate in 1984 as S. 1763 and
that is now before Congress as Title II of the proposed Criminal
Justice Reform Act (S. 1970 and H.R. 3777). The legislation
would create a one-year time limit on habeas corpus applications, normally running from exhaustion of state remedies; establish a relatively simple and uniform standard of review under
which the federal habeas court would generally defer to the state
courts' determination of a claim if the determination was rea-
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sonable and arrived at by procedures consistent with due process; clarify the standards for entertaining claims that were not
properly raised before the state courts; and effect various technical improvements in habeas corpus procedure. These limited reform proposals provide the best immediate prospect for effecting
basic improvements over the current system of review.
Finally, it may be possible to achieve some significant improvements through litigation, though the litigative options are
constrained by existing statutory standards and settled judicial
precedents. The possibilities in this area include securing judicial decisions extending the deferential standard of Stone v.
Powell-which now applies to fourth amendment exclusionary
rule claims-to Miranda and Massiah claims; securing the uniform application of restrictive standards concerning the raising
of claims that were not properly raised before the state courts;
and securing a stronger interpretation of the rule permitting the
dismissal of unreasonably delayed petitions.
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"The proceedings of the [Constitutional] Convention do not cast
much direct light on just what the Framers assumed the 'privileges' of the writ to be; but it was of course the clear contemporaneous understanding that the fundamental function of the
writ was to test executive detention and that convictions by a
criminal court of competent jurisdiction could not be reexamined on habeas corpus at all."
-

HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM'

"Another cause of overload of the federal system is [28 U.S.C.]
§ 2254, conferring federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to review
state court criminal convictions. There is no statute of limitations, and no finality of federal review of state convictions. Thus,
repetitive recourse is commonplace. I know of no other system of
justice structured in a way that assures no end to the litigation
of a criminal conviction. Our practice in this respect is viewed
with disbelief by lawyers and judges in other countries. Nor does
the Constitution require this sort of redundancy."
-- Justice Lewis F. Powell'
"If our nation's bifurcated judicial system is to be retained, as I
am sure it will be, it is clear that we should strive to make both
the federal and the state systems strong, independent, and viable. State courts will undoubtedly continue in the future to litigate federal constitutional questions. State judges in assuming
office take an oath to support the federal as well as the state
constitution. State judges do in fact rise to the occasion when
given the responsibility and opportunity to do so. It is a step in
the right direction to defer to the state courts and give finality
to their judgments on federal constitutional questions where a
full and fair adjudication has been given in the state court."
-[Justice]

Sandra Day O'Connor'

1. At 1513 (2d ed. 1973).
2. Address before ABA Divsion of Judicial Administration 9 (Aug. 9, 1982).
3. Trends in the Relationship between Federal and State Courts from the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 Wh. & MARY L. Rav. 801, 814-15 (1981).

SPRING AND SUMMER

1989]

Habeas Corpus

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction .........................................

I. History of Habeas Corpus .....................
A. The Common Law, The Constitution, And
The First Judiciary Act ...................
B. The Habeas Corpus Act Of 1867 ...........
C. Subsequent Judicial Developments .........
1. The Jurisdictional Standard ...........
2. Adequacy of State Processes ...........
3. Creation of a Quasi-Appellate Habeas
Corpus Jurisdiction ...................
D. Subsequent Legislative Developments ......
1. Reforms Currently in Effect ...........
2. Other Reform Efforts .................
II. The Current Jurisdiction ......................
A. Em pirical Findings .......................
1. Workload and Results .................
2. Character of Petitioners and Prior Proceed ings ..............................
3. D elay in Filing .......................
B. Recent Judicial Decisions .................
III. Considerations of Policy .......................
A. Traditional Reverence For The Great Writ
And Its Constitutional Status ..............
B. The Right To A Federal Forum ...........
C. Enforcement Of The Constitution ..........
D. The Need For Surrogate Supreme Courts...
E. Providing A Vehicle For The Articulation Of
Constitutional Rights .....................
F. Correcting Injustices ......................
G. Effects On The Behavior Of Prisoners ......
H. Other Arguments .........................
IV. Reform Options ..............................
A. Legislative Options .......................
1. Abolition of Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners .......................
2. Deference to Adequate State Processes..
3. Limited Reform Legislation ............
B. Litigative Options ........................
1. Applying the Stone v. Powell Standard to
O ther C laims .........................

* 915
916
918
921
924
925
928
932
937
939
941
945
946
947
949
949
952
953
954
955
957
959
962
963
964
965
966
969
969
972
974
978
979

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 22:3 & 4

Clarifying the Scope of the Procedural
.
........
Default Standard .........
of
the
the
Interpretation
3. Strengthening
Laches Rule ..........................
C onclusion ...........................................
Appendix: Habeas Corpus Cases ........................
2.

981
982
985
990

SPRING AND SUMMER

19891

Habeas Corpus

FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
REVIEW OF STATE JUDGMENTS

INTRODUCTION

The objective of the law in criminal prosecution, the Supreme
Court has stated, is twofold: "that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer."" As the earlier reports in this series have documented, the criminal justice system in the United States has, in
many areas, lost sight of this simple truth. The process of investigation and adjudication in criminal cases is burdened with
rules and procedures that are in conflict with its basic function.
A number of our earlier reports have been concerned with impediments to the search for truth that have their primary impact at the stages of investigation and trial. For example, the
police are frequently barred by the Miranda rules from engaging
in noncoercive, constitutionally proper questioning of suspects.
At trial, these rules and other judicially created rules may require that a defendant's pretrial statements be concealed from
the jury, though freely-given, probative, and reliable. Similarly,
the search and seizure exclusionary rule requires that the trier
be kept ignorant of physical evidence of unquestioned reliability
and probative value.5
The objectives of accuracy and substantive justice may also be
disserved beyond the point of conviction by unsound mechanisms of appeal and review. The government is generally barred
from seeking correction by an appellate court when the public is
endangered through the erroneous acquittal of a criminal, but
review of convictions at the instance of the defendant is, in contrast, essentially open-ended. Under the contemporary operation
of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, a person convicted of a
4.

Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).

5. See

OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 'TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE'
SERIES, REPORT No. 1, The Law of PretrialInterrogation(1986) [hereinafter REPORT No.
11, reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 437 (1989); OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF
IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE' SERIES, REPORT No. 2, The Search and Seizure
Exclusionary Rule (1986) [hereinafter REPORT No. 2], reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
JUSTICE, 'TRUTH

573

(1989); OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 'TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE'
SERIES, REPORT No. 3, The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel under the Massiah Line
of Cases (1986) [hereinafter REPORT No. 31, reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 661 (1989).
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crime by a state court may repeatedly seek to have his conviction overturned in the lower federal courts, with no particular
limit on how long he may wait before doing so. The grounds on
which relief from the state court judgment is sought may cast no
doubt on the defendant's factual guilt and may turn on close or
unsettled questions on which the lower federal courts themselves
disagree.
The frequent practical effect of this procedure is to convert
the process of review in criminal cases into a kind of interminable game, an open-ended hunt for official error.
In this attenuated process the question is not whether an
innocent defendant, mistakenly convicted, may enlist the
aid of an appellate court in correcting a miscarriage of
justice. Rather, it is whether a persistent defendant, however guilty, may eventually get lucky and persuade some
judge or court to find error, given unlimited opportunities to do so.6
This Report examines the process by which we have come to
have a system of review which "assures no end to the litigation
of a criminal conviction," a system which "is viewed with disbelief by lawyers and judges in other countries."7 Section I reviews
the history of habeas corpus. Section II describes the current
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. Section III discusses pertinent policy considerations. Section IV sets out the possibilities
and prospects for reform.

I.

HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS

The right to habeas corpus as understood at common law and
by the framers of the Constitution was essentially a right to judicial protection against unlawful executive detention. The
habeas corpus remedy could not be used to challenge the detention of a person pursuant to the judgment of a court unless the
judgment was void because the court lacked jurisdiction. The
Constitution's prohibition of suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus was intended to perpetuate habeas corpus in its tradi6. Assistant Attorney General Stephen J. Markman, Remarks at a Seminar on the
Administration of Justice, sponsored by the Brookings Institution, Annapolis, Maryland
1-2 (Mar. 8, 1986).
7. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Address before the American Bar Association Division of
Judicial Administration 9 (Aug. 9, 1982).
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tional character as a check on lawless incarceration by executive
authorities. The right to habeas corpus under the Constitution
and under the First Judiciary Act, enacted in 1789, was also only
a limitation on the power of the federal government, and had no
application to persons detained or incarcerated pursuant to state
authority.
In 1867, Congress created a broader statutory habeas corpus
remedy to provide a federal remedy for former slaves who were
being held in involuntary servitude in violation of the recently
enacted thirteenth amendment. While later applications of the
statutory remedy went beyond the narrow compass anticipated
by its framers, its scope initially remained quite limited. In the
initial period of judicial application, the courts generally adhered to the traditional standards under which a prisoner could
not challenge his incarceration pursuant to the judgment of a
court unless the judgment was void because the court lacked jurisdiction. Following Frank v. Mangum in 1915 and Moore v.
Dempsey in 1923, a somewhat broader inquiry emerged in the
decisions under which federal habeas corpus could be available
if no meaningful process existed in the state courts for considering a prisoner's federal claims. The final step in the creation of
the current habeas corpus jurisdiction came in decisions of the
1950s and 1960s which eliminated the conventional limitations
on the scope and availability of habeas corpus review and drastically expanded the federal rights of state defendants. The practical effect of this development has been to create a general appellate jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts in relation to
state criminal judgments.
The legislative interventions in the development of the habeas
corpus jurisdiction since 1867 have consistently involved restrictions on the availability of federal habeas corpus to prisoners in
state or local custody. Congress has barred access to federal
habeas corpus for persons convicted in the local court system of
the District of Columbia; conditioned appeals from district court
denials of habeas corpus petitions on obtaining a certificate of
probable cause; created a presumption of correctness for state
court fact-finding in habeas corpus proceedings; and enacted a
rule that delayed petitions can be dismissed in certain cases on
grounds of "laches." Congress has also given partial approval on
a number of occasions to reform proposals that would have virtually abolished federal habeas corpus for state prisoners or enacted more far-reaching limitations on its availability.
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The Common Law, The Constitution, And The First
Judiciary Act

At common law, habeas corpus was essentially a means of securing judicial review of the existence of grounds for executive
detention. If a person was taken into custody by executive authorities, he could petition a court to issue a writ of habeas
corpus, which would order the custodian to produce the prisoner
and state the cause of his commitment. If the government made
an adequate return stating that the petitioner was being held on
a criminal charge, the court could set bail for the petitioner, or
would allow him to be detained pending trial, depending on
whether the offense charged was bailable or non-bailable. If the
government could state no legal ground for holding the petitioner, the court would order his release.'
The importance of habeas corpus in this character-as a safeguard against arbitrary executive detention-was recognized by
the framers, who included in the Constitution a prohibition of
suspending the writ of habeas corpus, "unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require it." The writ
of habeas corpus referred to in the Suspension Clause of the
Constitution, however, differs in two fundamental respects from
the present-day statutory writ by which the lower federal courts
review state criminal judgments.
First, the right to habeas corpus set out in the Constitution
was only intended as a check on abuses of authority by the federal government, and was not meant to provide a judicial rem8.

See, e.g., Rader, Bailing Out a Failed Law: The Constitution and PretrialDetenCIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: A BLUEPRINT 91, 94-96 (1983); P. BATOR, P. MISiKIN,
D. SH~pmo, & H. WECHSLER. HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1513 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]; Developments-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1038, 1042-45 (1970) [hereinafter Developments];
Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-HabeasCorpus, 64 MICH. L. REv. 451, 451, 46061, 468 (1966); Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States-1776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 243,
243-45, 262 (1965).
The description in the accompanying text reflects the basic functions of the commonlaw writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum (the "Great Writ"). The writ assumed its
mature form in the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, which strengthened and partially codified the common-law procedures for eliciting a statement of charges and enforcing bail
rights. 31 Car. 2, ch.2. The Act exempted persons committed on charges of felony or
treason from the benefits of the writ under its general provisions, but prescribed time
limits for indicting and trying such persons. Id.; see Collings, Habeas Corpus for Convicts - ConstitutionalRight or Legislative Grace?, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 335, 337-38 (1952).
Habeas corpus also served some miscellaneous functions in the common-law period,
such as testing the validity of process under which a person was held before trial, challenging unlawful restraint by private persons, or testing a committing court's jurisdiction. A general survey of early American practice appears in Oaks, supra (1965 article).

tion in
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edy for unlawful detention by state authorities. This point is evident, to begin with, from the placement of the Suspension
Clause in Section 9 of Article I of the Constitution, which is an
enumeration of limitations on the power of the federal government. The corresponding enumeration of restrictions on state
authority in Section 10 of Article I contains no right to habeas
corpus.
The same understanding was evident in the debate over the
Suspension Clause at the constitutional convention. There was
no dissent from the desirability of protecting the right to habeas
corpus from federal interference, but the convention divided on
whether a proviso should be stated to this general principle that
would enable the federal government to suspend the writ in
emergency situations. It was assumed in the debate at the convention that the states would remain free to suspend the writ
even if the Suspension Clause were adopted in an unqualified
form, and it was argued unsuccessfully that this made federal
suspension power unnecessary.9 Shortly after the ratification of
the Constitution, the First Congress in 1789 made the restriction
of the federal habeas corpus right to federal prisoners explicit,
providing in the First Judiciary Act (ch. 14, § 20, 1 Stat. 81-82):
[T]he justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of
the district courts, shall have power to grant writs of
habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the
cause of commitment. Provided, That writs of habeas
corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol [i.e.,
jail], unless where they are in custody, under or by colour
of the authority of the United States, or are committed
for trial before some court of the same ...
Second, the writ referred to in the Constitution, as noted
above, was the common law writ of habeas corpus, whose essential function was to serve as a check on arbitrary executive detention. Recognition of the common law scope of the writ is reflected in the Constitution's authorization of the suspension of
the writ in cases of rebellion or invasion, whose obvious purpose
was to permit in such circumstances executive detention uncon9. See 2 M. FARRAND, THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 438
(1966); 3 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENrIoN OF 1787, at 157, 213,
290 (1966). The majority was evidently unpersuaded that the individual states' suspension power would be equal to the exigencies of invasion and rebellion. The minority position also failed to take account of the potential need to suspend the writ in response to
rebellion by a state, as opposed to rebellion against a state. This point assumed reality
when the writ was suspended through federal action during the Civil War.
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strained by normal legal processes and standards.10 As Blackstone explained:
To bereave a man of life, or by violence to confiscate his
estate, without accusation or trial, would be so gross and
notorious an act of despotism, as must at once convey the
alarm of tyranny throughout the whole kingdom. But
confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to
[jail], where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten, is a
less public, a less striking, and therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government. And yet sometimes,
when the state is in real danger, even this may be a necessary measure.

.

.

. [T]he

. .

. legislative power, when-

ever it sees proper, can authorize the crown, by suspending the habeas corpus act for a short and limited
time, to imprison suspected persons without giving any
reason for so doing. .

.

. [T]his experiment ought only to

be tried in cases of extreme emergency; and in these the
nation parts with its liberty for a while, in order to preserve it for ever."
The framers' conception of habeas corpus as a check on executive abuses and a pretrial remedy that could be used to elicit a
statement of the cause of commitment and enforce bail rights
was also reflected in other ways in the materials associated with
the adoption and implementation of the Constitution. Before
the proviso to the Suspension Clause permitting suspension in
cases of rebellion or invasion was voted on at the constitutional
convention, a final objection was heard that the suspension authority was unnecessary because judges already had discretion to
commit persons or bail them in most important cases. 2 In Federalist No. 84, Hamilton explained the habeas corpus right in
the proposed Constitution by citing Blackstone's characterization of habeas corpus as a remedy for arbitrary, secret imprisonment. As noted above, the First Judiciary Act described the
function of the writ as "inquiry into the cause of commitment"
and referred to its availability to federal prisoners "committed
for trial."
10.

See generally supra note 9 and accompanying text.

11. W. BLACKSTONE, 1 COMM NrrARIES ON
12. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 9, at 438.

THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

131-32 (1765).
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The Habeas Corpus Act Of 1867

Between 1789 and the end of the Civil War, there was little
change in the character of federal habeas corpus. In response to
particular incidents of state resistance to the execution of federal law and interference with a foreign agent, acts of 1833 and
1842 extended the availability of federal habeas corpus to certain agents of foreign governments and to federal officers detained in the states for acts done in carrying out their duties."3
In other respects, the First Judiciary Act's limitation of the
availability of habeas corpus in the federal courts to persons in
federal custody remained operative. The writ's application to
federal prisoners continued to be limited to its common law
functions.
After the Civil War, however, Congress enacted the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1867, which extended the availability of the federal writ to persons "restrained of . . . liberty" in violation of
federal law, without any requirement of federal custody. The
Act was drafted in response to a resolution of December 19,
1865, of the House of Representatives directing its Judiciary
Committee
to inquire and report to this House, as soon as practicable, by bill or otherwise, what legislation is necessary to
enable the courts of the United States to enforce the
freedom of the wives and children of soldiers of the
United States under the joint resolution of Congress of
March 3, 1865, and also to enforce the liberty of all persons under the operation of the constitutional amendment abolishing slavery. 4
The "resolution of March 3, 1865" referred to in this directive
was a measure predating the thirteenth amendment 5 which
freed the families of Black Union soldiers who lived in areas that
were not covered by the earlier Emancipation Proclamation. The
reference to the constitutional amendment abolishing slavery
was to the thirteenth amendment, which went into effect the
day before the directive was adopted.
13. Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. Cmi. L. REV. 31, 33 (1965).

14.

CONG. GLOBE,

39th Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1865).

15. See 13 Stat. 571 (1865).
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The initial version of the bill resulting from this directive extended the availability of habeas corpus in the federal courts to
persons held in "slavery or involuntary servitude," but a later
version of the bill, which was eventually enacted, contained the
broader "restraint of liberty" language. The probable reason for
this language change may be found in the efforts of the slave
states to circumvent emancipation by enacting oppressive apprenticeship, contract labor, and vagrancy laws that restrained
the liberty of former slaves. The broader language of the final
version of the bill would have been more readily applicable to
restraints of liberty under these laws than the earlier "slavery or
involuntary servitude" version. 6
The reformulated bill was brought up on the floor of the
House of Representatives by Representative Lawrence in the
first session of the 39th Congress. The general merits of the proposal were not debated, but Representative Le Blond objected
to a proviso in the bill which stated that it was inapplicable to
persons held by the military authorities on charges of military
offenses or of participation in rebellion against the federal government prior to the passage of the act. Lawrence responded
that the bill was not addressed to the situation of persons in
military custody. Rather, he explained, the bill was introduced
pursuant to the resolution of December 19, 1865,'" and would
correct the inadequacy of federal jurisdiction to protect the
rights and liberties of the persons referred to in the resolution.
Following this brief interchange, the bill was passed by the
House."8
In the Senate, the bill was then brought up by Senator Trumbull, whose discussion of the measure indicated that it was a
House bill with which he had limited familiarity. As in the
House, the debate was brief, and focused on the proviso relating
to persons in military custody and some minor collateral issues.
In the course of the debate, Trumbull pointed out that the Judiciary Act of 1789 limited the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the
federal courts to persons held under federal laws. He stated that
the point of the bill was to extend the availability of federal
habeas corpus to persons who might be held under state laws in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 9
Trumbull's explanation may have been an improvisation based
16. See Mayers, supra note 13, at 34-35, 43-44.
17. See supra text accompanying note 14.
18. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4150-51 (1866). See generally Mayers, supra
note 13, at 36-38.
19. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4228-30 (1866).
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on the face of an unfamiliar proposal,20 or may have been an
unelaborated reference to the state laws which were being used
to keep freed slaves in a de facto state of servitude.2" On account
of the objections raised about collateral matters in the Senate,
the bill was held over. It passed in the next session without further significant debate.22
Overall, the legislative history of the Act shows a clear purpose of providing a federal remedy for emancipated slaves who
were being deprived of liberty in the states. It does not show
that the creation of a broadly applicable federal remedy for state
prisoners was intended or anticipated.2"
However, the language of the Act-together with the absence
of committee reports and the perfunctory discussion of its purpose on the House and Senate floors-contained the seeds of
later expansive developments. On its face, the enacted bill provided a general authorization for exercising federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction for the benefit of persons who were being de20. See Mayers, supra note 13, at 38-39.
21. In 1868, while arguing for withdrawal of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review the denial of habeas corpus to a person in military custody, Senator Trumbull explained the original purpose of the Act of 1867 as follows:
The act of 1789 authorized the issuing of. . . writs in cases where persons were
deprived of their liberty under. . . color of authority of the United States. Why,
then, was the Act of 1867 passed? It was passed to authorize writs of habeas
corpus to issue in cases where persons were deprived of their liberty under State
laws or pretended State laws. It was the object of the Act of 1867 to. . . meet a
class of cases which was arising in the rebel States, where, under pretense of
certain State laws, men made free by the Constitution of the United States were
virtually being enslaved, and it was also applicable to cases in the State of Maryland where, under an apprentice law, freedmen were being subjected to a species
of bondage.
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2096 (1868); accord, id. at 2168 (Representatives Hubbard and Wilson). Maryland was mentioned separately from the "rebel" states in Trumbull's statement because it was a slave state that sided with the Union. See Mayers,
supra note 13, at 43-44, 52 n.80.
22. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 730, 790 (1867).
23. Some post-enactment statements indicated that the Act of 1867 was adopted to
protect Union loyalists or officers, as well as freed slaves, from persecution in the rebel
states. See Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 322 (1867) (argument of Senator
Trumbull as counsel for the government); CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Seas. 2126 (1868)
(Senator Buckalew). This interpretation was initially proffered in the context of efforts
to prevent Southern resisters from using the Act to challenge the military governance of
the subjugated Confederacy. It may have originated as an afterthought which permitted
unfavorable comparisons between the resisters who sought to use the Act and the loyal
persons it was meant to protect. See Mayers, supra note 13, at 48-52 & n.70. It may also
have reflected some confusion between the Habeas Corpus Act and other Reconstruction
measures. See id. at 39 n.37; see also CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Seas. 2119-20 (1868).
Even if these post-enactment statements are taken as accurate, however, they show no
broader purpose than dealing with specific evils arising from the unique conditions attending Reconstruction.
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nied liberty in violation of federal law. In contrast, the initial
version of the proposal2 4 had expressly limited its application to
persons held in slavery or involuntary servitude.
This difference in formulation would not have appeared particularly significant at the time of the bill's enactment in 1867.
Imprisonment pursuant to the judgment of a court was generally
not considered to be in violation of law for purposes of habeas
corpus, even if the judgment was predicated on legal error."'
Moreover, there were virtually no limitations on restraints of liberty in the states under federal constitutional or statutory law,
aside from the thirteenth amendment and related civil rights
legislation: The rights of criminal defendants against the states
under the original Constitution were minimal; the Bill of Rights
did not apply to the states; and the fourteenth amendment had
not yet been proposed or ratified." However, with the ensuing
expansion of federal procedural rights through constitutional
amendment and judicial innovation, the potential resulted for
broad federal court review of state criminal judgments, to the
extent that the federal courts were willing to abrogate the traditional restrictions on the function of the habeas corpus remedy.
The course by which these restrictions were eroded and eventually abandoned is examined in the next part of this Report.
C.

Subsequent Judicial Developments

The development of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction
subsequent to 1867 falls naturally into three stages. In the initial
period, the common law standards generally remained in effect
and habeas corpus could not be used to challenge a conviction
entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. In the course of the
second period, the jurisdictional standard was supplanted by a
general approach under which the availability of federal habeas
24. See supra text accompanying note 16.
25. See Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 201-03 (1830); Oaks, supra note 8, at
262 (1965 article); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners,76 HARy. L. REV. 441, 466, 474-75 (1963).
In the final stages of the Senate debate on the Habeas Corpus Act, Senator Johnson
raised the possibility of an application being made under the Act by a person convicted
and imprisoned in a state, but his statements indicate that he was considering the case of
a person in federal custody being held within the territory of a state pursuant to the
judgment of a federal tribunal that lacked jurisdiction. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d
Sess. 730, 790 (1867). Granting relief in such a case would have been consistent with the
traditional scope of habeas corpus. See infra text accompanying notes 27-29.
26. See Mayers, supra note 13, at 44-45, 52-55.
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corpus would depend on whether the state had provided some
meaningful process for considering a defendant's federal claims.
In the third period, innovative decisions of the 1950s and 1960s
effectively converted the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction into
a general appellate jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts in
relation to state criminal judgments.
1.

The JurisdictionalStandard

As discussed earlier, the essential function of the common law
habeas corpus remedy that was incorporated into the Constitution was to guard against abuses of executive power affecting
personal liberty. Imprisonment pursuant to the judgment of a
court could accordingly not be challenged through a habeas
corpus application. The only significant qualification to this
principle was that the question of a committing court's jurisdiction could be raised in a habeas corpus proceeding, reflecting the
view that a judgment entered without jurisdiction was a
27
nullity.
a. Federal prisoners- The Supreme Court consistently applied these common law principles in relation to federal prisoners in its early decisions under the First Judiciary Act. For example, in Ex parte Watkins,8 the Supreme Court refused to
consider the merits of a habeas corpus application alleging that
the petitioner had been convicted pursuant to a defective indictment. The Court explained:
A judgment, in its nature, concludes the subject on which
it is rendered, and pronounces the law of the case. The
judgment of a court of record whose jurisdiction is final,
is as conclusive on all the world as the judgment of this
court would be. . . . It puts an end to inquiry concerning
the fact, by deciding it...
27. See, e.g., Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 201-03 (1830); Oaks, supra note
8, at 261-62 (1965 article). Even jurisdictional challenges were often effectively precluded
by a presumption that a court of general jurisdiction acted within the scope of its authority. A broader inquiry was authorized in relation to the judgments of "inferior"
courts under a rule that the jurisdiction of such a court must be shown affirmatively.
However, "inferior" courts in the relevant sense only included certain courts of limited
jurisdiction-for example, a court martial might be so classified-and did not include the
regular lower federal courts or state courts of general jurisdiction. See Ex parte Watkins,
28 U.S. at 203-05, 207-09; W. CHURCH, A TREATISE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
§§ 266-68 (2d ed. 1893).
28. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202-03 (1830).
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An imprisonment under a judgment cannot be unlawful,
unless that judgment be an absolute nullity; and it is not
a nullity if the court has general jurisdiction of the subject, although it should be erroneous.
The enactment of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 made it possible for federal prisoners to point to that Act, as well as to the
original habeas corpus provisions of the First Judiciary Act, as
the basis for their applications. This did not, however, result in
any change in the scope of the writ. Federal convicts were still
confined to the assertion of jurisdictional defects.2 9
Post-Civil War cases involving federal prisoners did, however,
generate some extension of the notion of a "jurisdictional" defect.80 The Supreme Court held in Ex parte Siebolds ' that a
conviction pursuant to an unconstitutional statute could be attacked on habeas corpus, stating that "[a]n unconstitutional law
is void, and is as no law," and that "if the laws are unconstitutional and void, the Circuit Court acquired no jurisdiction of the
causes." This doctrine, as the cited passages indicate, reflected
the notion that a prosecution pursuant to an invalid statute was
tantamount to a prosecution carried out without any kind of legal authority. The late nineteenth century cases also reflected a
greater willingness to grant review by habeas corpus where a
claim implicated the sentencing authority of the committing
32

court.

The tendency to apply an extended notion of "jurisdiction" in
certain areas apparently resulted in part from the pressures generated by the general preclusion of appellate review in federal
criminal cases during most of the nineteenth century. Even this
limited extension of habeas corpus review was curtailed after
federal defendants were given the right to appeal.8" Throughout
this period, the general rule continued to be that a conviction
would not be overturned in a habeas corpus proceeding if the
29. This was consistent with the intent behind the 1867 Act. Federal habeas corpus
had been available to federal prisoners under settled common law standards from the
beginning of the nation, and both the House and Senate managers of the 1867 Act emphasized that its purpose was to create an enlarged jurisdiction for the benefit of certain
persons who were "restrained of. . . liberty" in the states. See supra text accompanying
notes 16-22. They presumably would have taken it for granted that the traditional standards would continue to apply in any overlapping application of the new jurisdiction to
federal prisoners.
30. See Developments, supra note 8, at 1045-48; Bator, supra note 25, at 465-74.
31. 100 U.S. 371, 375-77 (1879).
32. See Bator, supra note 25, at 467-68, 471-72.
33. Id. at 473-74 (rejection in early twentieth century cases of habeas corpus review
of constitutionality of criminal statutes).
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court rendering the judgment had the authority to hear and decide the case."
b. State prisoners- In relation to state prisoners, it became
apparent in the early cases that the text of the 1867 Act provided inadequate guidance concerning the exercise of the enlarged federal habeas corpus jurisdiction it had created. State
defendants filed petitions under the Act while state proceedings
were underway or after they had been concluded, but the Act
contained no provision concerning deference to prior state adjudications or pending state proceedings. Rather, it provided simply that the district court was to find the facts in a summary
fashion on the basis of the testimony and arguments of the interested parties.
These features of the Habeas Corpus Act become more understandable when one considers its narrow original purpose. The
typical case anticipated by the Act's framers would not have
been that of a defendant in a state prosecution, but of an emancipated slave who was unlawfully being kept in a state of servitude by a private slaveholder, perhaps under the purported authority of a state statute redesignating the slave as an
"apprentice" or holding him to a labor contract under threat of
criminal sanctions. In such a case, the question of deference to
state judicial processes would not arise. Moreover, the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 authorized the removal of state proceedings
to federal court as protection against violations of its provisions
by state authorities."' Thus, there already existed in 1867 a more
complete protection against violations of the narrow range of existing federal rights in state prosecutions. This would also have
tended to eliminate any reason for the framers of the Habeas
Corpus Act to anticipate or make provision for the case of a defendant who asserted violations of federal rights in state judicial
proceedings. 6
34. See id. at 471-74, 483-84.
35. The Civil Rights Act conferred national citizenship on blacks and provided for
equality of civil rights regardless of race. Section 3 of the Act authorized removal to
federal court of state proceedings against persons who were denied or could not enforce
in the state courts the rights secured by the Act, and state proceedings against officers
for acts done pursuant to the Civil Rights Act or the Freedmen's Bureau Act. See Act of
April 9, 1866, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
36. See Mayers, supra note 13, at 43-48. The only reference to the effect of state
proceedings in the Act of 1867 was a provision declaring "null and void" state proceedings relating to the subject of a habeas corpus petition which took place while habeas
corpus proceedings or appeals therefrom were underway, or after a final judgment in
such proceedings discharging the petitioner. Considering the general purpose of the Act,
the obvious point of this provision was to prevent a slaveholder from invoking state judi-
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Hence, the state defendant who sought relief under the
Habeas Corpus Act presented a case whose procedural ramifications had not been addressed in the formulation of the statute.
When cases of this sort did subsequently arise, the Supreme
Court adopted two doctrines in dealing with them.
First, the Court held that the power conferred by the Habeas
Corpus Act should ordinarily not be exercised until the state
courts had had an opportunity to address the petitioner's allegations in the normal course of state proceedings. The doctrine
was first articulated by the Court in Ex parte RoyaU1, 3 7 which

rejected a petitioner's pretrial challenge to his detention on a
state indictment pursuant to an allegedly unconstitutional statute. The doctrine deriving from Ex parte Royall and its progeny, termed the requirement of "exhaustion of state remedies,"
is now codified as 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c).
Second, in cases involving state prisoners-as in cases involving federal prisoners-the jurisdictional standard was applied,
following the traditional understanding of the nature and function of the habeas corpus remedy. In the absence of a jurisdictional defect, violations of a defendant's constitutional rights in
state proceedings were not grounds for relief in federal habeas
corpus proceedings."
2. Adequacy of State Processes
The second stage in the development of the statutory habeas
corpus remedy-in which the jurisdictional standard of review
was ultimately abandoned-arose from the decisions of Frank v.
Mangum3 ' in 1915 and Moore v. Dempsey 0 in 1923.
In Frank v. Mangum, the petitioner argued that relief on federal habeas corpus should be available because the state proceedings involved denials of due process-specifically, mob influence on the trial and the defendant's absence from the court
when the verdict was returned-that were sufficient to divest
cial processes to regain custody of the slave after habeas corpus proceedings had been
instituted. See id. at 47-48.
37. 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
38. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 452-54 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Developments, supra note 8, at 1048-50; Bator, supra note 25, at 478-84. The extended notion of
a "jurisdictional" defect encompassing the unconstitutionality of the governing statute
was also applied in cases involving state prisoners. See Developments, supra note 8, at
1049; Bator, supra note 25, at 479-80.
39. 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
40. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
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the trial court of jurisdiction and make the judgment against the
defendant a nullity.4 The Supreme Court rejected this argument on the ground that the petitioner had not established that
he had been subjected to any denial of due process.42 In addressing these issues, the Court emphasized that the state proceedings as a whole had to be considered, including the "corrective
process" provided by the state for considering the trial irregularities alleged by the petitioner. In light of the state courts' consideration and rejection of the petitioner's contentions in the
context of new trial motions and appeals to the state supreme
court, the Court found that no due process violation had
occurred.4
Eight years later, the Court invoked the Frank decision's standards in holding that another mob-domination claim could
properly be reviewed on habeas corpus. Moore v. Dempsey"" involved several black defendants who had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death in a situation of widespread racial
conflict and violence in Arkansas. The Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld the convictions with an essentially conclusory rejection of the defendants' allegations of mob domination at trial.45
The defendants then applied for federal habeas corpus on the
ground that "the proceedings in the State Court, although a trial
in form, were only a form, and that the [defendants] were hurried to conviction under the pressure of a mob without any regard for their rights and without according to them due process
of law.'4 The district court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court overturned the dismissal, holding that federal
habeas review was properly available, in the absence of adequate
state corrective process, to examine a claim that the state trial
was a sham proceeding conducted under mob domination:
41. See 237 U.S. at 318-23.
42. The Court assumed that a due process violation would constitute a "jurisdictional" defect because the fourteenth amendment denies the state authority (jurisdiction) to deprive a person of life or liberty without due process. See 237 U.S. at 326-28,
331-32. However, this did not entail any broad scope of review because of the narrowness
of the general concept of due process at that time-notice and an opportunity to be
heard before a competent tribunal-and because of the Court's insistence that the whole
course of the state proceedings must be considered in determining whether adequate
process had been provided. See id.at 326-27, 335-36, 340.
43. The "corrective process" point was emphasized in rejecting the claim of mobdomination. The claim relating to the defendant's absence at the end of the trial was
rejected on the ground that the state could validly treat it as waived in light of the
procedural history of the case. 237 U.S. at 338-44.
44. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
45. See Bator, supra note 25, at 488-89.
46. 261 U.S. at 87.
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In Frank v. Mangum ... it was recognized of course that
if in fact a trial is dominated by a mob. . . and . . "if
the State, supplying no corrective process, carries into execution a judgment . . . produced by mob domination,
the State deprives the accused of his life or liberty without due process of law." We assume in accordance with
that case that the corrective process supplied by the
State may be so adequate that interference by habeas
corpus ought not to be allowed. It certainly is true that
mere mistakes of law . . . are not to be corrected in that
way. But if the case is that the whole proceeding is a
mask-that counsel, jury, and judge were swept to the fatal end by an irresistible wave of public passion, and that
the State Courts failed to correct the wrong, neither
perfection in the machinery for correction nor the possibility that the trial court and counsel saw no other way Of
avoiding an immediate outbreak of the mob can prevent
this Court from securing to the petitioners their constitutional rights.
. . . We shall not say more concerning the corrective
process afforded to the petitioners than that it does not
seem to us sufficient to allow a Judge of the United
States to escape the duty of examining the facts for himself when if true as alleged they make the trial absolutely
void.47
The specific holding in Moore v. Dempsey was narrow, 48 and
later habeas corpus decisions continued for some time to speak
the language of "jurisdictional" error. As a practical matter,
however, cases following Moore showed a greater receptivity toward utilizing habeas corpus as a means of reviewing claims
which could not be raised or considered by other means.49 In
0
Waley v. Johnston5
the Court held explicitly that non-jurisdic-

47. 261 U.S. at 90-92.
48. The Court's decision in Moore is intelligible in terms of common law habeas
corpus standards. It apparently reflected the view that the general rule against challenging the results of a judicial proceeding on habeas corpus did not apply if there had been
no real judicial proceeding. There was evidence that the trial court had effectively acted
as an instrument of the mob, rather than as a judicial forum in any realistic sense, making the proceedings "void." Cf. Ashe v. Valotta, 270 U.S. 424, 426 (1926) (in Moore there
was allegedly "only the form of a court under the domination of a mob").
49. See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
467-68 (1938).
50. 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942).

SPRING AND SUMMER

1989]

Habeas Corpus

tional claims could be entertained in certain circumstances in
habeas corpus proceedings. 5 1
It must be emphasized, however, that the relaxation of standards in this period did not immediately result in a quasi-appellate habeas corpus jurisdiction. Moore v. Dempsey itself had observed that "[ilt certainly is true that mere mistakes of law...
are not to be corrected" by habeas corpus,52 and much later decisions continued to reflect a conception of habeas corpus as a
backstop remedy which would only come into play if its unavailability would effectively leave the petitioner with no possible
remedy." The general approach of the period was summed up
by the Court in Ex parte Hawk:"
Where the state courts have considered and adjudicated the merits of [a petitioner's] contentions

. . .

a fed-

eral court will not ordinarily reexamine upon writ of
habeas corpus the questions thus adjudicated. .

.

. But

where resort to state court remedies has failed to afford a
full and fair adjudication of the federal contentions
raised, either because the state affords no remedy, see
Mooney v. Holohan.

.

. or because in the particular case

the remedy afforded by state law proves in practice unavailable or seriously inadequate, cf. Moore v. Dempsey,
261 U.S. 86; Ex parte Davis, 318 U.S. 412, a federal court
should entertain his petition for habeas corpus, else he
55
would be remediless

51. Waley involved a habeas corpus petition by a federal prisoner who alleged that
-his guilty plea was coerced. The Court held that the claim could be raised on habeas
corpus because the alleged threats against the petitioner were off the record and could
not be considered on appeal. 316 U.S. at 104-05.
52. 261 U.S. at 91; see Knewel v. Egan, 268 U.S. 442, 445-47 (1925) ("habeas corpus
calls in question only the jurisdiction of the court whose judgment is challenged. . . the
judgment of state courts in criminal cases will not be reviewed on habeas corpus merely
because some right under the Constitution of the United States is alleged to have been
denied to the person convicted").
53. See Bator, supra note 25, at 493-99.
54. 321 U.S. 114, 118 (1944).
55. The facts of the cases cited in relation to potentially appropriate circumstances
for habeas corpus review were as follows: In Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935), the
petitioner alleged that his conviction was solely based on the prosecution's knowing use
of perjurious testimony, and that the factual basis of this claim could not have been
discovered through reasonable diligence prior to his new trial motion and state appeal. It
was unclear whether this type of claim could be raised under any state remedy. Moore v.
Dempsey was the mob-domination case discussed supra at text accompanying notes 4453. In Ex parte Davis, the petitioner alleged that he could not pursue a state appeal
because the state would not provide a free transcript of a trial court proceeding and he
could not afford to pay for a transcript.

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL.

22:3 & 4

3. Creation of a Quasi-Appellate Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction
The final stage in the expansion of the federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction came in the decisions of Brown v. Allen" in 1953
and Townsend v. Sain 57 and Fay v. Noia58 in 1963. These deci-

sions abrogated the conventional limitations on the habeas
corpus remedy and also provided that habeas corpus review was
not to be subject to the normal constraints applicable in direct
review by appellate courts. In conjunction with the expansion of
substantive constitutional rights by decisions of the 1960s, this
created a general review jurisdiction of the inferior federal
courts over the judgments of state courts in criminal cases.
a. Expansion of the scope of review- Brown v. Allen involved state prisoners whose claims of discrimination in jury selection and coerced confessions had been considered and rejected in state proceedings. The Supreme Court nevertheless
reexamined the merits of the prisoners' claims before affirming
the state judgments when they were brought up on habeas
corpus. In the words of Professor Henry Hart, the decision
"manifestly broke new ground":
[The decision] seems to say that due process of law in the
case of state prisoners is not primarily concerned with
the adequacy of the state's corrective process or of the
prisoner's personal opportunity to avail himself of this
process . . . but relates essentially to the avoidance in

the end of any underlying constitutional error. 9
In its specific formulation, Brown v. Allen involved two major
opinions-the formal opinion of the court authored by Justice
Reed, and a separate opinion by Justice Frankfurter. 0 Justice
Reed's opinion for the Court was characterized by a certain
vagueness in its treatment of the standard-of-review issue. The
Court noted that a state court's determination of a petitioner's
claims was not res judicata, but emphasized that a federal court
had discretion to reject a petition on the state record if satisfied
56. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
57. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
58. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
59. Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84, 106 (1959).
60. Justice Frankfurter wrote formally for the Court only on the effect in a habeas
corpus proceeding of a prior denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court. See 344 U.S. at
451-52. However, four other Justices apparently agreed with the general views expressed
in his opinion. See id. at 488, 497, 513.
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that "the state process has given fair consideration.

. .

and has

resulted in a satisfactory conclusion," and that no hearing "on
the merits, facts or law" was required if the court was "satisfied
that federal constitutional rights have been protected." 1 In
turning to the specific claims raised in the case, the Court stated
that it was reviewing the district court's conclusion that the
state "accorded petitioners a fair adjudication of their federal
questions, ' ' a but it then proceeded to carry out a detailed consideration of the merits of those questions.
Justice Frankfurter's opinion was far more emphatic in its
specification of the duties of a federal habeas court in reviewing
a state judgment. State fact-finding could be relied on, he
stated, in the absence of some "vital flaw" in the state process,
but Congress has "commanded" federal district judges to exercise independent judgment concerning questions of law and the
application of law to fact:
State adjudications of questions of law cannot, under the
habeas corpus statute, be accepted as binding. It is precisely these questions that the federal judge is commanded to decide.
. . . Where the ascertainment of the historical facts
does not dispose of the claim but calls for interpretation
of the legal significance of such facts . . . the District

Judge must exercise his own judgment on this blend of
facts and their legal values. Thus, so called mixed questions or the application of constitutional principles to the
facts as found leave the duty of adjudication with the
federal judge.
• . . Although there is no need for the federal judge
• . . to shut his eyes to the State consideration of such
issues, no binding weight is to be attached to the State
determination. The congressional requirement is greater.
The State court cannot have the last say when it, though
on fair consideration and what procedurally may be
deemed fairness, may have misconceived a federal constitutional right.
These standards . . . preserve the full implication of

the requirement of Congress that the District Judge de61.
62.

344 U.S. at 458, 463-64.
344 U.S. at 465.
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cide constitutional questions presented by a State prisoner even after his claims have been carefully considered
by the State courts. Congress has. . . seen fit to give this
Court power to review errors of federal law in State determinations, and in addition to give to the lower federal
courts power to inquire into federal claims, by way of
habeas corpus.63
Unfortunately, Justice Frankfurter failed to explain the provenance of the legislative mandate that a federal trial judge reconsider the substantive accuracy of state court determinations of
such questions and that he override those determinations whenever he happens to disagree with them. No such purpose can be
inferred from the legislative history of the Habeas Corpus Act of
1867, and Congress never subsequently voiced any objection to
the far narrower standards of review that had been applied in
innumerable decisions by the Supreme Court and lower federal
courts between 1867 and 1953.
The legislative history of the version of the habeas corpus
statutes that was before the Court in Brown v. Allen-enacted
as part of the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code-also did not
provide any support for the legislative "command" discerned by
Justice Frankfurter. Rather, it showed an assumption that a
prisoner could seek federal habeas corpus relief if he was denied
a "fair adjudication" of his federal claims in state proceedings.'
This was not the quasi-appellate standard of Brown v. Allen,
but the adequacy-of-state-process standard that had emerged in
decisions following Moore v. Dempsey.
Finally, Justice Frankfurter failed to explain why Congress-which allegedly had mandated that federal trial judges
protect constitutional rights by automatically re-determining
relevant non-factual issues-nevertheless left the same judges
with discretion to let possible constitutional violations go by if
63.

344 U.S. at 506-09.

64. The House bill contained explicit "fair adjudication" language in proposed 28
U.S.C. § 2254. The House Committee Report, H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
A180 (1947), characterized this as declaratory of existing law as set out in Ex parte
Hawk, a decision that gave a particularly clear statement of the principle of deference to
adequate state processes. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55. The Senate deleted
this language and made other changes because the House formulation conflated the standard of review and the exhaustion requirement and because it was assumed that review
under the fair adjudication standard would be available in any event following exhaustion of state remedies. See S. REP. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1948).

SPRING AND SUMMER

19891

Habeas Corpus

they resulted from erroneous state court determinations of the
facts relevant to the resolution of a constitutional claim.65
The last major steps in the expansion of the habeas corpus
jurisdiction came in 1963,
with the decisions of Townsend v.
67
Sain" and Fay v. Noia.

In Townsend, the Court replaced the rather diffuse pronouncements of Brown v. Allen concerning the discretion of district judges to defer to state fact-finding with a detailed set of
limitations on the authority of federal habeas courts to respect
state court determinations. Specifically, the Court held that a
new evidentiary hearing would have to be held by the habeas
court whenever
(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in
the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination is
not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the
fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was
not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is
a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5)
the material facts were not adequately developed at the
state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that
the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant
a full and fair fact hearing."
The Court in Townsend also stated that the district judge may
not defer to the state courts' findings of law and must independently apply federal law to the facts, indicating that these points
had been settled by Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Brown v.
Allen."
Finally, in Fay v. Noia, the Court addressed the question of
when federal habeas courts could consider claims that had not
been raised before the state courts in conformity with applicable
state procedural rules. Proceeding under remarkable misconceptions concerning the historical function of habeas corpus,"0 the
Court held that procedural defaults which would bar raising a
claim on direct review would not be accorded the same effect in
65. See generally Bator, supra note 25, at 502.
66. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
67. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
68. 372 U.S. at 313.
69. 372 U.S. at 318.
70. See HART & WECHSLM supra note 8, at 1465-66; Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CM. L. Rav. 142, 170-71 (1970);
Mayers, supra note 13; Oaks, supra note 8 (1966 article).
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habeas corpus proceedings. Rather, a claim could be denied on
such grounds only if a petitioner "deliberately by-passed" state
procedures, and even in such a case, entertaining the claim
would remain within the discretionary authority of the federal
habeas judge.
b. Expansion of substantive rights- Thus, by the early
1960s, the Supreme Court had removed practically all significant
limitations on the ability of federal district courts to entertain
and review federal claims raised by state prisoners in habeas
corpus proceedings.
The effect of these innovations was vastly magnified by the
coitcomitant increase in the federal rights that were available for
assc-tion. The Court's case law of the 1960s was characterized by
unprecedented expansions of the general concept of constitutional due process; innovative decisions which held, contrary to
earlier precedent, that most of the specific procedural provisions
of the Bill of Rights applied in state proceedings; and expansive
interpretations and extensions of those provisions. The general
effect of this development was to eliminate state discretion with
respect to most basic questions of criminal procedure, and to
make it possible to dress up almost any sort of alleged procedural irregularity or error as a constitutional claim. As Judge
Friendly has observed:
[T]he limitation of collateral attack to "constitutional"
grounds has become almost meaningless. ...
The dimensions of the problem of collateral attack today are a consequence of two developments. One has
been the Supreme Court's imposition of the rules of the
fourth, fifth, sixth and eighth amendments concerning
unreasonable searches and seizures, double jeopardy,
speedy trial, compulsory self-incrimination, jury trial in
criminal cases, confrontation of adverse witnesses, assistance of counsel, and cruel and unusual punishments,
upon state criminal trials. The other has been a tendency
to read these provisions with ever increasing breadth
* ,**The result of these two developments has been a
vast expansion of the claims of error in criminal cases for
which a resourceful defense lawyer can find a constitutional basis.
Any claimed violation of the hearsay rule is now regularly presented not as a mere trial error but as an infringement of the sixth amendment right to confrontation. Denial of adequate opportunity for impeachment
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would seem as much a violation of the confrontation
clause as other restrictions on cross-examination have
been held to be. Refusal to give the name and address of
an informer can be cast as a denial of the sixth amendment's guarantee of "compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses." Inflammatory summations or an erroneous
charge on the prosecution's burden of proof become denials of due process. So are errors in identification procedures. Instructing a deadlocked jury of its duty to attempt to reach a verdict or undue participation by the
judge in the examination of witnesses can be characterized as violations of the sixth amendment right to a jury
trial. Examples could readily be multiplied. Today it is
the rare criminal appeal that does not involve a "constitutional" claim.
... Whatever may have been true when the Bill of
Rights was read to protect a state criminal defendant
only if the state had acted in a manner "repugnant to the
conscience of mankind," the rule prevailing when Brown
v. Allen was decided, the "constitutional" label no longer
assists in appraising how far society should go in permitting relitigation of criminal convictions."'
In conjunction with the elimination of constraints on the
scope and availability of habeas corpus review, the pervasive
constitutionalization of state procedure effectively converted the
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction into a general review jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts in relation to state criminal
judgments. While the claims that could be asserted were still
limited to "constitutional" claims, the relative trivialization of
the concept of constitutional error tended to deprive this constraint of practical significance.
D. Subsequent Legislative Developments
Following the enactment of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867,
Congress has never moved ahead of the courts in extending the
scope or availability of federal habeas corpus. Its interventions
in this area have primarily been directed to limiting or offsetting
the effects of judicial innovations that resulted in an increased
availability of federal habeas corpus.
71.

Friendly, supra note 70, at 149, 155-57.
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The earliest and best-known restriction of the federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction following the Civil War resulted from the
case of Ex parte McCardle./ The Reconstruction Act of 18678
divided the rebel states into military districts and authorized the
use of military commissions or tribunals to control the civilian
population in the subjugated areas. The framers of the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1867 had sought to guard against its use by persons in military custody through an express proviso in the legislation, but the proviso only exempted from the Act's coverage
persons held for military offenses or for "having aided or abetted
rebellion. . prior to the passage of this act." This did not, by
its terms, apply to acts of resistance subsequent to the passage
of the Habeas Corpus Act, and Southern resisters promptly attempted to take advantage of the loophole.
McCardle, a civilian held in custody by the military authorities for trial by a military commission, was denied a writ by a
federal district court, and appealed the denial to the Supreme
Court. Concerned that the Supreme Court might hold the Reconstruction scheme unconstitutional, Congress divested the
Court of jurisdiction over appeals under the Habeas Corpus Act
of 1867. The Court upheld the validity of this restriction in Ex
parte McCardle, and dismissed the appeal. The Court's review
jurisdiction under the Act was not restored until 1885. "
While the earliest legislative restriction of habeas corpus
under the Act of 1867 related to a federal prisoner, the focus of
subsequent concerns has been state prisoners' use of the Act to
challenge their convictions. As early as 1884, a House Judiciary
Committee Report75 strongly criticized the practice of lower federal courts under the Act of entertaining challenges to state convictions. In the Committee's view, the Act was part of the legislative response to the danger to Union loyalists and resistance to
emancipation that existed in the Confederacy following the Civil
War, and was not meant to give the inferior federal courts the
authority to overturn the judgments of state courts. However,
the Committee declined to take any direct action against this
type of review on the grounds that the "special causes" which
had motivated the Act's adoption might still exist to some extent, and that restoring the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdic72.
73.
74.
75.

74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 153, § 3, 14 Stat. 428.
See Mayers, supra note 13, at 41 & n.44, 51 & n.76.
H.R. Rep. No. 730, 48th Cong., 1st Seas. (1884).

SPRING AND SUMMER

1989]

Habeas Corpus

tion might be adequate to secure a satisfactory construction of
the Act.
In the current century, a number of significant restrictions on
federal habeas corpus have been enacted, and more far-reaching
reforms have received partial approval by Congress on a number
of occasions. Measures currently in effect and other reform efforts will be discussed separately.
1. Reforms Currently in Effect
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2553 and Fed. R. App. P.
22, a state prisoner is barred from appealing the denial of habeas
corpus by a district court unless a circuit judge or district judge
certifies that there is probable cause for the appeal. This requirement derives from an enactment of 1908 whose specific
purpose was to curb the use of habeas corpus appeals and the
associated stay of state proceedings to delay the execution of
capital sentences. It currently serves the general purpose of
avoiding the need for a full-dress appeal where the petitioner
cannot make a substantial showing of a denial of a federal
right.7 6
In 1966, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which creates
a presumption of correctness for state court fact-finding in
habeas corpus proceedings if certain conditions are satisfied, and
provides that the petitioner has the burden of overcoming this
presumption by "convincing evidence." This goes beyond the
rule of Townsend v. Sain, which only held that a habeas court
could dispense with an evidentiary hearing in certain
circumstances. 8
In 1976, Congress adopted a general set of procedural rules for
habeas corpus proceedings. Rule 9(a) provides that a petition
76. See generally Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 892-93 & n.3 (1983).
The utility of the certificate-of-probable-cause requirement has been limited by the
vesting of authority in district judges as well as circuit judges to grant certification, and
by its inapplicability to appeals in collateral proceedings involving federal prisoners. Proposed remedial legislation is discussed infra at text accompanying note 189.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
78. Section 2254(d) was enacted as part of legislation proposed by the Judicial Conference that also contained restrictions relating to repetitive applications (now
§ 2244(b)-(c)). The Committee Reports on the legislation were S. Rizp. No. 1797, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) and H.R. REP. No. 1892, 89th Cong., 2d Seas. (1966).
The utility of the § 2254(d) presumption has been limited by the fact that it only
applies to purely factual determinations and by the vagueness of some of the statutory
conditions on the application of the presumption. Proposed remedial legislation is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 186-87.
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may be dismissed if the state has been prejudiced in its ability
to respond by delay in filing unless the petitioner shows that the
petition is based on grounds he could not have discovered
through reasonable diligence before the circumstances prejudicial to the state occurred. This overturned judicial precedents
which held that petitions could not be dismissed on grounds of
delay ("laches"). 79
In addition to the foregoing reforms affecting state prisoners,
two noteworthy changes affecting the habeas corpus right of federal prisoners have been brought about through legislation.
First, in the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, Congress replaced habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy for federal
prisoners with a statutory motion remedy codified as 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255. The rule of habeas corpus procedure requiring a prisoner to apply to the court having jurisdiction over the place
where he is incarcerated had resulted in a concentration of
habeas corpus petitions in the judicial districts containing major
federal prisons. Section 2255 effected a more equitable distribution of prisoner litigation among the district courts by providing
instead that a prisoner must apply to the court that sentenced
him. It did not change the substantive standards governing applications for collateral relief by federal prisoners, but did tend
to ensure that applications for such relief would be made in the
district where pertinent records and witnesses are most readily
available, "where the facts with regard to the procedure followed
are known to court officials, and where the United States Attorney who prosecuted the case will be at hand to see that these
facts are fairly presented." 80
Second, in establishing a separate court system for the District of Columbia in 1970, Congress barred D.C. prisoners from
seeking habeas corpus in the federal courts, limiting them instead to a collateral remedy in the D.C. courts. The practical
effect of this reform is that prisoners in D.C. have no access to
the lower federal courts to review their convictions or sentences,
but such review remains available for persons convicted in the
substantially similar court systems of the states. The Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of this reform in Swain v.
79.

The background, interpretation, and limitations of Rule 9(a) are discussed infra

Part IV.B.3.
80. Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 175, 178 (1949);
United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 212-19, 220-21 (1952).
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Pressley.8" The significance of the experience in D.C. is further
82
discussed in a later portion of this Report.
2. Other Reform Efforts
In the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, the requirement of
exhaustion of state remedies in habeas corpus proceedings was
codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The codification, after stating that
access to federal habeas was generally barred unless state remedies were exhausted, went on to specify:
An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the
remedies available in the courts of the State, within the

meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law
of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the
question presented.
The enactment of this provision-now section 2254(c)-was
the culmination of efforts by the Judicial Conference in the
course of the 1940s to secure the limitation of federal habeas
corpus for state prisoners.83 Judge Parker, who chaired the Judicial Conference's habeas corpus committee and played the leading role in its work on this legislation, explained that the provision would generally bar access to federal habeas corpus in any
state which permitted repetitive recourse to its collateral remedies. He also expressed the view that this would have the practical effect of abolishing federal habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy for state prisoners across the board:
81. 430 U.S. 372 (1977). The Court rejected the argument that the motion remedy
under the D.C. Code is an inadequate substitute for habeas corpus because the D.C.
judges (like most state judges) lack life tenure. See 430 U.S. at 381-83. The Court also
relied on the fact that the Code preserves the potential availability of habeas corpus
where the motion remedy "is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of... detention." However, this qualification has proven to be essentially theoretical. No decision
has found the local remedy inadequate or ineffective to examine alleged errors at the
trial level. See generally Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Streater v.
Jackson, 691 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1982), raised the possibility that a D.C. prisoner's
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal might be considered on federal
habeas corpus in light of the unavailability of the statutory motion remedy to review
appellate proceedings, but the federal petition was dismissed in light of the D.C. Court
of Appeals' subsequent rejection of the petitioner's claims. See Streater v. United States,
478 A.2d 1055 (D.C. App. 1984).
82. See infra Part IV.A.1.
83. See generally Parker, supra note 80; Reports of the Judicial Conference of the
United States 22-23 (1943), 22 (1944), 28 (1945), 21 (1946), 46 (April 1947), 17-18 (Sept.
1947).
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The effect of this . . . provision is to eliminate, for all
practical purposes, the right to apply to the lower federal
courts for habeas corpus in all states in which successive
applications may be made for habeas corpus to the state
courts; for, in all such states, the applicant has the right,
notwithstanding the denial of prior applications, to apply
again to the state courts for habeas corpus and to have
action upon such later application reviewed by the Supreme Court . . . on application for certiorari ....
[T]here should be no more cases where proceedings of
state courts, affirmed by the highest courts of the state,
.. . will be reviewed by federal circuit or district
judges."
Notwithstanding the unequivocal language of the provision of
section 2254(c) and Judge Parker's observations concerning its
meaning, the Supreme Court in Brown v. Allen refused to give it
effect 85 and held that exhaustion does not require repetitive recourse to state remedies. In reaching this result, the Court
stated that it was unwilling to accept so radical a change from
prior habeas practice without "a definite congressional
direction."
Shortly after Brown v. Allen, the Judicial Conference tried
again. The legislation it proposed this time provided that a federal habeas corpus application by a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a state court could be entertained
only on a ground which presents a substantial Federal
constitutional question (1) which was not theretofore
raised and determined, (2) which there was no fair and
adequate opportunity theretofore to raise and have determined, and (3) which cannot thereafter be raised and
determined in a proceeding in the State court, by an order or judgment subject to review by the Supreme Court
of the United States on writ of certiorari.8 6
This proposal was supported by the Judicial Conference, the
Conference of (State) Chief Justices, the National Association of
Attorneys General, the section on judicial administration of the
84. Parker, supra note 80, at 175-78.
85. See 344 U.S. at 447-50.
86. Habeas Corpus: Hearings on H.R. 5649 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1955).
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American Bar Association, and the Department of Justice. 7 Following hearings in the first session of the 84th Congress before a
subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee," it was voted
out by the Judiciary Committee 9 and passed by the House of
Representatives on Jan. 19, 1956.90 It was passed a second time
by the House of Representatives on March 18, 1958. 91
In the course of Congress's consideration of this proposal, the
proponents of the legislation pointed out that the use of habeas
corpus as a writ of review was a recent development that was
unrelated to its historical function. The general purpose of the
legislation was to bar access to habeas corpus in the inferior federal courts whenever a means was available for raising a claim
and creating a record for Supreme Court review in the state
courts. It was argued that this reform would correct the increased caseload burdens, indefinite prolongation of litigation,
delay in carrying out capital sentences, and conflict between the
state and federal judiciaries that had resulted from the recent
expansions of federal habeas corpus. It was also noted that legislation to the same effect had been enacted in the 1948 revision
of the Judicial Code, and that the new legislation was necessitated by the Supreme Court's refusal in Brown v. Allen 92 to give
effect to this reform in the absence of a clearer expression of
legislative intent. 93
Despite repeated passage in the House, the Judicial Conference's proposal was never brought to a vote in the Senate. In
contrast, the next "abolition" proposal that made significant
progress in Congress originated in the Senate. Title II of the
proposed Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
was formulated as a general response to Warren Court activism
in the criminal justice area." It contained provisions designed to
overturn Miranda v. Arizona and other Supreme Court decisions barring the use of traditionally admissible evidence, and
also contained a provision, proposed 28 U.S.C. § 2256, which
would have abolished federal habeas corpus as a post-conviction
remedy for state prisoners:
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 7.
See supra note 87.
See H.R. REP. No. 1200, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
See 102 CONG. REc. 935-40 (1956).
See 104 CONG. REc. 4668, 4671-75 (1958).
See supra text accompanying notes 83-85.
See 102 CONG. REC. 935-36, 939 (1956).
Title II is generally discussed in REPORT No. 1, supra note 5, Part II.B.2.
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The judgment of a court of a State .
in a criminal action shall be conclusive with respect to all questions of
law or fact which were determined, or which could have
been determined, in that action until such judgment is
reversed, vacated, or modified by a court having jurisdiction to review by appeal or certiorari such judgment; and
neither the Supreme Court nor any inferior [federal]
court . . . shall have jurisdiction to reverse, vacate, or

modify any such judgment of a State court except upon
appeal from, or writ of certiorari granted to review, a determination made with respect to such judgment upon
review thereof by the highest court of that State having
jurisdiction to review such judgment."
The bill was voted out by the Senate Judiciary Committee.
The Committee Report stated that the proposal relating to
habeas corpus would correct the problems of delay and abuse
resulting from recent Supreme Court decisions that had transformed habeas corpus into a quasi-appellate mechanism. In supporting the constitutionality of the reform, the Report noted
that the constitutional writ of habeas corpus was only a means
of eliciting a statement of the grounds for detention and could
not be used to challenge a conviction by a court with jurisdiction; that the Constitution's preservation of the habeas corpus
right only operates against the federal government and not the
states; and that the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 was only enacted
as a means of enforcing the thirteenth amendment."
Following extensive debate on the Senate floor, a compromise
was reached under which the anti-Mirandaprovisions of the legislation-now 18 U.S.C. § 3501-were retained, but proposed 28
U.S.C. § 2256 and the other provisions of Title II restricting
federal court jurisdiction were deleted. 7
The contemporary focus of legislative reform efforts has been
bills based on a set of limited reform proposals that Attorney
General William French Smith initially transmitted to Congress
in 1982. 98 The current reform proposals would establish a oneyear time limit on habeas corpus applications by state prisoners,
normally running from exhaustion of state remedies; narrow the
95.
96.

114 CONG. REc. 14182 (1968).
S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Seas., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2112, 2150-53.
97. See REPORT No. 1, Part II.B.2.
98. See generally The Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1982: Hearing on S. 2216
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Seas. (1982).

SPRING AND SUMMER

19891

Habeas Corpus

standard of review in habeas corpus proceedings; clarify the circumstances under which claims that were not properly raised
before the state courts can be raised in habeas corpus proceedings; make technical improvements in habeas corpus procedure;
and institute certain comparable reforms in the collateral remedy for federal prisoners. The nature and rationale of these proposals are more fully discussed in a later portion of this
Report."
These proposals were approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee and passed by the full Senate in 1984 by a vote of 67 to
9.10 In the 99th Congress (1985-86) they were not brought to a
vote in the Senate because of filibustering by opponents of the
legislation at Senate Judiciary Committee mark-ups.1 0 1 In the
House of Representatives they have been introduced with broad
sponsorship in various bills,1 02 which have invariably been buried at the subcommittee level in the House Judiciary Committee. No significant action has occurred in the House because of
opposition by the House leadership.
In the current (100th) Congress, the reform proposals have recently been transmitted to Congress again by the President as
Title II of the proposed Criminal Justice Reform Act (S. 1970
and H.R. 3777).
II.

THE CURRENT JURISDICTION

Justice Robert Jackson, in his separate opinion in Brown v.
Allen, complained that judicial expansions of the federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction were resulting in "floods of stale, frivolous
and repetitious petitions [which] inundate the docket of the
lower courts and swell our own."'' 3 The "flood" to which Justice
Jackson referred consisted of 541 petitions in the preceding year
99. See infra Part IV.A.3.
100. In the 98th Congress, the proposals were transmitted by the President to Congress as Title VI of the proposed Comprehensive Crime Control Act. Following hearings,
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983: Hearings on S. 829 Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,98th Cong., 1st Seas. 16-17, 32-41,
160-65 (1983), the proposals were voted out by the Senate Judiciary Committee as a
separate bill (S.1763), see S. REP. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), and passed by
the Senate, see 130 CONG. REc. 1854-72 (1984).
101. There was an additional hearing in the 99th Congress. See Habeas Corpus Reform: Hearing on S. 238 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985).
102. E.g., H.R. 5594, 98th Cong., 2d Sess (1984).
103. 344 U.S. at 536.
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(1952). In comparison, 9,542 federal habeas corpus petitions
were filed by state prisoners in the most recent reporting year
(ending June 30, 1987). As these figures indicate, habeas corpus
applications were a relatively rare occurrence prior to the creation of a quasi-appellate federal habeas corpus jurisdiction by
judicial decisions of the 1950s and 1960s, but now constitute a
major category of federal litigation. More detailed statistical and
quantitative information is set out in the first part of this
section.
While the volume of habeas corpus litigation has grown in recent years, the marked tendency of the Supreme Court's decisions since the start of the 1970s has been to draw back from the
heady expansion of inferior federal court review of state judgments that characterized the Court's habeas corpus jurisprudence of the 1960s. The most significant decisions of the current
period are described briefly in the second part of this section.
A.

Empirical Findings

Information concerning the volume of habeas corpus applications and other federal litigation is available in the Annual Reports of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts. As noted above, these figures show that large-scale
habeas corpus litigation by state prisoners is a recent phenomenon in historical terms. In 1941 there were 127 petitions. In 1961
there were 1,020. The number of applications thereafter increased astronomically in the course of the 1960s, reaching 9,063
in 1970; subsided in the early 1970s, reaching a low of 6,866 in
1977; and has since increased fairly steadily. The figures for
habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners in the federal
district courts over the past ten years are as follows:1 "
104. The figures in the text are drawn from the Annual Reports of the Director of the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. The aggregate figures for state prisoner habeas
corpus petitions include, in addition to normal petitions in which jurisdiction is predicated on claimed violations of federal rights ("federal question" petitions), a small number of petitions by prisoners in United States territories where the federal courts have
jurisdiction over local criminal matters ("local jurisdiction" petitions). For example, the
1987 figure of 9,542 comprised 9,524 "federal question" petitions and 18 "local jurisdiction" petitions, and the 1986 figure of 9,045 comprised 9,040 "federal question" petitions
and 5 "local jurisdiction" petitions. In addition to reporting 9,542 habeas corpus petitions by state prisoners, the most recent report (1987) noted 1,808 habeas corpus petitions and 1,664 "motions to vacate sentence" by federal prisoners (Table C2).
A tabular summary of the volume of prisoner litigation between 1961 and 1982 appears
in S. REP. No. 226, 98th Cong., st Sess. 4 n.ll (1983). A more comprehensive summary of
statistical data relating to habeas corpus litigation appears. in SPEciAL REPORT OF THE
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1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
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APPLICATIONS
FILED
7,033
7,123
7,031
7,790
8,059
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YEAR
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987

APPLICATIONS
FILED
8,532
8,349
8,534
9,045
9,542

More detailed statistical information is available from a study
of habeas corpus litigation that was funded by the Justice Department and completed in 1979. The study, carried out by Professor Paul Robinson, examined a sample containing 1,899 petitions filed between 1975 and 1977, which comprised about oneeighth of all habeas corpus applications filed in the country in
the relevant period.1 0 5 The general picture of habeas corpus litigation that emerges from the available empirical data and other
factual information is as follows:
1. Workload and Results
The work involved in processing habeas corpus cases constitutes a substantial burden on state officials and the court system. In connection with a typical petition, the state is required
to transmit records and to respond to the legal and factual contentions raised by the petitioner. The district court must review
the record to the extent necessary and redetermine each claim
that is properly presented, working from the evidentiary basis
set out in the record together with the submissions and arguments of the parties. Frequently the district court's decision is
appealed, resulting in additional work for judges, state officials
and defense counsel at the level of the federal courts of apBUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL REVIEW OF STATE PRISONER PETITIONS: HABEAS
CoRPus (March 1984) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL REPORT].

105. The findings of the study were initially reported in P. ROBINsON, AN EMPIRICAL
STUDY OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF STATE COURT JUDGMENTS (Federal Justice
Research Program 1979). The data gathered in the study was later independently analyzed in Allen, Schachtman, & Wilson, Federal Habeas Corpus and its Reform: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 13 RUTGERS L. J. 675 (1982). A concise summary of the main findings of
these reports appears in STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note 104, at 5-7.
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peals. 1 Since a prisoner is required to exhaust state remedies
before seeking federal habeas corpus, the lure of an additional
level of review in the federal courts-in which claims rejected at
the state level are open to relitigation-results in increased recourse to state remedies. The availability of federal habeas
corpus accordingly increases the workload of the state courts as
well as the federal courts. 107
Despite the substantial expenditure of prosecutorial and judicial resources entailed in habeas corpus litigation, the normal
outcome is dismissal of the petition or affirmance of the state
judgment. In the 1979 study, only 3.2% of petitions resulted in
any form of relief and only 1.7% resulted in an order directing
release from custody. " Even these low figures cannot be taken
as reliable indications of the "benefits" of habeas corpus review,
since there is no reason to believe that the federal court determination in such cases is generally "better" than the contrary state
judgment it supersedes. In purely descriptive terms, a successful
petition normally means only that a federal trial judge disagreed
with a number of state trial and appellate judges.10 9 The judgmental or subjective nature of the determinations required is
suggested by the large differences observed in the 1979 study between the granting rates for different federal judges-a small
number of judges accounted for a large proportion of successful
petitions.1 10 As Judge Friendly has observed:
In the vast majority of cases we agree with the state
courts . . . . In the few where we disagree, I feel no assurance that the federal determination is superior ....
[W]e do not know how many of these [successful habeas]
cases represented prisoners . . . whom society has
grievously wronged . . . or how many were black with
106. See P. ROmNSON, supra note 105, at 21-23; The Habeas Corpus Reform Act of
1982: Hearing on S.2216 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d
Seas. 42-44 (1982); Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983: Hearings on S.829 Before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 41 (1983).
107. See generally Friendly, supra note 70, at 144 n.10.
108. See P. ROBINSON, supra note 105, at 4(c), 14.
109. Even where an appellate panel affirms the granting of a writ, the issue remains
one of disagreement among federal and state judges who are equally bound to uphold the
Constitution and federal law. See generally infra Parts III.B-.D.
110. See P. ROBINSON, supra note 105, at 53 (out of 51 judges who handled state
habeas petitions, three judges accounted for 29.9% of all petitions granted and twelve
judges accounted for over two-thirds of all petitions granted).
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guilt. The assumption that many of them fall in the former category is wholly unsupported. " '
In considering the low incidence of successful petitions, an
analysis of the study data concluded that "[ilf one considers
only the statistically measurable benefits of habeas review, they
appear to be outweighed by the costs of expansive habeas
review.""'
2. Characterof Petitionersand Prior Proceedings
The 1979 study indicated that habeas corpus petitioners constitute a highly atypical class of prisoners. Most petitioners had
been convicted of serious, violent offenses. Over 80% had been
convicted after trial, and practically the same proportion had
had, or were having, direct appellate review of their cases in the
state system. Moreover, about 45% of petitioners had pursued
collateral remedies in the state courts, including over 20% who
had filed two or more previous state petitions. Over 30% of petitioners had filed at least one previous federal petition." 8
In contrast, the vast majority of state defendants plead guilty
and have no trial or appeal. Thus, habeas corpus typically operates as a mechanism for providing additional review to prisoners
whose cases have already received an abundance of judicial process in comparison with the average criminal case.
3.

Delay in Filing

Another finding of the 1979 study is that there are frequently
enormous delays between the conclusion of the normal adjudica111. Friendly, supra note 70, at 165 n.125, 148 & n.25; see also Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (opinion of Jackson, J.) ("Whenever decisions of one court are reviewed by another, a percentage of them are reversed. That reflects a difference in outlook normally found between personnel comprising different courts. However, reversal
is not proof that justice is thereby better done. There is no doubt that if there were
a super-Supreme Court, a substantial proportion of our reversals of state courts would
also be reversed.").
112. Allan, Schachtman, & Wilson, supra note 105, at 683. But cf. id. at 683-90 (noting non-quantitative costs and benefits alleged for habeas corpus review). These nonquantitative considerations are examined infra Part III.
113. See P. RoBINsoN, supra note 105, at 4(a), 7, 15. Even where a petitioner has not
had prior state court review of his claims, this does not imply that means for raising such
claims are unavailable in the state courts. Prisoners frequently by-pass state remedies
and file procedurally defective habeas corpus petitions. See id. at 13.
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tory process in the state courts and the filing of a habeas corpus

petition. About 40% of the petitions in the study were filed
more than five years after conviction and nearly a third were
filed more than ten years after conviction. Still longer delays
were noted in some cases in the study, up to more than fifty
years from the time of conviction.""
The tolerance shown in habeas corpus proceedings for lengthy
delays in seeking review is particularly striking in comparison
with other procedures for seeking review or re-opening of criminal judgments in the federal courts, which are subject to definite
time limits. Federal defendants, for example, generally must decide whether to appeal within ten days; 1 5 state convicts seeking
direct review of their convictions in the Supreme Court generally
must apply within sixty days;" 6 and even a federal prisoner who
claims to have new evidence of his innocence discovered after
trial is subject to a two-year time limit on seeking a new trial
under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33.
The problem of delay has been particularly acute in capital
cases. In such cases, the continuation of litigation prevents the
sentence from being carried out. While thirty-seven states currently authorize capital punishment, and about 2,000 prisoners
are currently under sentence of death, the typical capital case is
characterized by interminable litigation and re-litigation, and
fewer than a hundred executions have been carried out in the
past twenty years." 7 The federal habeas corpus jurisdiction pro114. See Allen, Schachtman, & Wilson, supra note 105, at 703-04. The cited report's
characterization of this data as showing that "lengthy delay . . . rarely occurs" is
idiosyncratic.
Legitimate post-conviction delays in filing of up to a few years can result from the
exhaustion requirement, but this cannot account with any frequency for time intervals
exceeding a decade, which the study found to be common. The average time prisoners
took to exhaust state remedies was 2.8 years from conviction. See id. at 705. This average
figure would actually exaggerate the time necessary to complete the state review process,
since it would be inflated by cases in which prisoners failed to pursue certain claims at
trial or on direct review and then delayed a number of years before presenting them on
collateral attack in the state system.
Delays of the length and frequency noted in the report also cannot be explained on the
basis of petitions challenging events that occurred some time after conviction, such as
parole denial or revocation. Petitions of this sort were a small part of all petitions in the
study; nearly a third of all petitions were filed more than ten years after conviction, but
the average time intervals for petitions challenging post-conviction events were far less
than that; and the average delay in the various districts covered by the study was not
correlated with the incidence of such petitions. See id. at 703-04 n.103, 706 & nn.109-10.
115. See Fz. R. APP. P. 4(b).
116. See SuP. CT. R. 20.

117.

NAACP

LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, DEATH

Row, U.S.A. (Nov. 1,

1987). A general analysis of the problem of dilatory habeas corpus litigation in capital
cases appears in Associate Deputy Att'y General Paul Cassell, Statement before the Sub-
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vides an avenue for obstruction and delay in these cases which
the states are powerless to address. Attorney General William
French Smith observed:
[T]he inefficiency of current court procedures has resulted in a de facto nullification of the decisions of most
state legislatures to impose capital punishment for some
crimes. The "public interest" organizations that routinely
involve themselves in the litigation carried on in capital
cases have fully exploited the system's potential for obstruction. Delay is maximized by deferring collateral attack until the eve of execution. Once a stay of execution
has been obtained, the possibility of carrying out the sentence is foreclosed for additional years as the case works
its way through the multiple layers of appeal and review
in the state and federal courts.
The solution to this problem lies in part in the reform
of state court procedures. .

.

. The efficacy of state re-

forms is severely limited, however, by the availability of
federal habeas corpus, which cannot be limited by the
state legislatures. .

.

. It

. .

. prevents correction of the

practical nullification of all capital punishment legislation that has resulted from litigational delay and
obstruction." 8
Overall, the available data provides a more definite empirical
content to Justice Jackson's characterization of habeas corpus
petitions as "stale, frivolous and repetitious." The delays involved in habeas corpus litigation greatly exceed those allowed
under any other appellate mechanism, the prospect of success is
slight, and the review that is provided generally amounts to another round on claims that have already been thoroughly worked
over in the state courts.
comm. on Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture of the House Comm. on
Government Operations concerning Habeas Corpus and Capital Punishment Litigation
(Feb. 26, 1988).
118. Smith, Proposals for Habeas Corpus Reform, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: A
BLUEPRINT

137, 145-46 (1983).

Executions have resumed on a significant basis within the past few years, though the
number carried out remains a minute fraction of the number of prisoners under capital
sentence. The causes of this development presumably include the Supreme Court's resolution of various issues in its capital punishment caselaw whose uncertainty had previously impeded executions, and a toughening of the Court's stance toward delay in capital
cases through habeas corpus litigation. See generally Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880
(1983).
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B. Recent Judicial Decisions
The Supreme Court, in its current habeas corpus jurisprudence, has given weight to considerations of finality and federalism that were ignored or shrugged off in the expansive decisions
of the 1960s. While the Court's ability to make changes in this
area is constrained by precedent and existing statutory provisions, some noteworthy limitations have emerged in recent decisions. The most important decisions include the following:
First, the decisions in McMann v. Richardson" and Tollett v.
Henderson'" generally limit a defendant challenging a guilty
plea in a habeas corpus proceeding to the claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in connection with the plea.
This normally precludes challenges to pleas based on alleged antecedent violations of constitutional rights, such as a claim that
the plea resulted from a coerced confession obtained at an earlier point.
Second, the Court has narrowed the grounds for excusing procedural defaults in habeas corpus proceedings. Under normal
standards of appellate review, claims that are not properly
raised in a proceeding in a lower court are generally barred on
review. Nevertheless, Fay v. Noial" held that a failure to raise a
claim in conformity with state procedural rules would not justify
dismissing the claim in a subsequent federal habeas corpus proceeding unless the defendant "deliberately bypassed" state procedures.12 2 Fay v. Noia's rejection of all ordinary concepts of finality and orderly procedure has since been repudiated by the
Court, which held in Wainwright v. Sykes1 3 that procedural defaults will generally not be excused unless the petitioner establishes "cause" for the default and "prejudice" resulting from the
alleged violation. Later decisions have generally given narrow
readings of the notion of "cause," holding, for example, that an
attorney's error in failing to raise a claim is not "cause" in the
relevant sense unless it was so serious as to amount to constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.""'
119. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
120. 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
121. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
122. See supra text accompanying note 70.
123. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
124. The most recent and comprehensive explication of the "cause and prejudice"
standard appears in Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
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Third, in Stone v. Powell,12 5 the Court held that fourth

amendment exclusionary rule claims cannot be raised on federal
habeas corpus, so long as a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate
the claim was provided in state proceedings. As a practical matter, this generally bars review
of fourth amendment claims in
12
habeas corpus proceedings.

1

Fourth, the decision in Sumner v. Mata2 put teeth in 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)'s general rule of deference to state court factfinding.1 28 It required lower federal courts to identify the specific
statutory criterion that was not satisfied in cases in which the
presumption of correctness for state fact-finding is not applied,
and to explain the basis for the conclusion that the criterion was
not satisfied.
III.

CONSIDERATIONS OF POLICY

Federal habeas corpus operates today as a quasi-appellate
mechanism by which the litigation of state criminal cases can be
continued and indefinitely prolonged in the lower federal courts.
While it is generally taken for granted that one appeal as a matter of right beyond the trial stage satisfies the interest in fairness to the individual litigant, habeas corpus provides additional
mandatory review beyond the various levels of direct review and
collateral review in the state court systems. While federal review
of the judgments of state courts has traditionally been confined
to direct review in the Supreme Court, the current habeas
corpus jurisdiction enables individual federal trial judges to
overturn the considered judgments of state supreme courts in
criminal cases.
A particularly striking feature of the current system is the
failure of the standards and procedures associated with federal
habeas corpus to keep pace with its expanding scope. If habeas
corpus is limited to providing a judicial check on arbitrary detention by executive authorities-the basic scope of the "habeas
corpus" right under the Constitution '2 9-there is no need for
time limits or rules concerning deference to prior judicial determinations. If a statutory habeas corpus remedy authorizes origi125. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
126. See Halpern, Federal Habeas Corpus and the Mapp Exclusionary Rule After
Stone v. Powell, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1982).
127. 449 U.S. 539 (1981).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
129. See supra Part I.A.
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nal proceedings in the federal district courts to challenge the
continued enslavement of blacks in violation of the post-Civil
War emancipation,13 0 there is similarly no need or place for any
particular constraints on the proceedings.
However, once habeas corpus has been transformed into a regular appellate mechanism-by which state prisoners may obtain
additional review of claims that have already been considered
and rejected at multiple levels of the state court system-the
result is an essentially redundant litigative process which imposes costs and strains that would not be tolerated in any other
context. No legislature would pass a law stating that a defendant
has a right to appeal, but that he may wait as long as he wishes
before doing so. No legislature would pass a law stating that a
defendant may appeal again and again if dissatisfied with the
results the first time around. No legislature would pass a law
stating that a defendant has a right to further mandatory review
of a nearly unlimited range of alleged procedural errors that
have already been thoroughly considered and rejected by other
courts of appeals. Yet all of these characteristics can be found in
the current federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.3 1
To the extent that this extraordinary type of review is to be
retained, one would expect to find some extraordinary justification for doing so. The policy considerations bearing on this question will be examined in the remainder of this section.
A.

TraditionalReverence For The Great Writ And Its
ConstitutionalStatus

Proposals for modifying the existing scope of federal habeas
corpus are frequently met with confused arguments that such
proposals would interfere with the Great Writ of the common
law, whose suspension is prohibited by the Constitution outside
of extreme situations of public emergency. The traditional esteem of habeas corpus, it is argued, precludes or at least strongly
130. See supra Part I.B.
131. As discussed elsewhere in this Report, there is no time limit on habeas corpus
applications and the restriction of the claims raised to federal questions has become
largely meaningless. See supra text accompanying notes 71, 114-16. Delay in filing is
constrained only by the "laches" doctrine of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 9(a). Under Rule
9(b), grounds for relief rejected on the merits in an earlier federal petition may be dismissed if presented again in a successive petition, but dismissal on this basis is a matter
of discretion and grounds not previously presented can be dismissed only if their earlier
omission "constituted an abuse of the writ."
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militates against any reform that would impair its scope or
availability. 's
Arguments of this sort do not rise above the level of a simple
logical fallacy-the fallacy of equivocation' S-because the common law writ referred to in the Constitution and the contemporary statutory writ by which lower federal courts review state
judgments are distinct remedies that, in fact, have nothing to do
with each other. The constitutional "writ of habeas corpus" is a
remedy that federal prisoners can use before trial to test the existence of grounds for detention by executive authorities.' ' The
current statutory "writ of habeas corpus" is a remedy that state
prisoners can use after trial and exhaustion of state appellate
remedies to secure additional review of judicially imposed
detention.
The only discernible similarities between these two remedies
are that (1) they have the same name, and (2) both can be
used-albeit in completely different circumstances-to seek relief from detention or incarceration which is alleged to be legally
unjustified. Similarity (1) is purely verbal, and similarity (2)
would apply equally to all other mechanisms for reviewing or reopening criminal judgments, such as ordinary appeals and new
trial motions. No one has yet suggested that the use of appeals
and new trial motions to challenge convictions and imprisonment transforms them into "habeas corpus" in the constitutional sense. The grounds for identifying the current statutory
habeas corpus remedy with the traditional writ safeguarded by
the Constitution are equally insubstantial.
B.

The Right To A Federal Forum

Another argument commonly offered in support of the existing habeas corpus jurisdiction is that a person asserting a fed132. See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 70, at 142, 170-71 (noting and responding to
argument).
133. - "Equivocation" involves drawing specious inferences by using a term with a particular meaning at one point in an argument and using the same term with another
meaning at a different point in the argument. This occurs in arguments which infer that
the contemporary statutory "habeas corpus" remedy should not be restricted because
the common law revered and the Constitution protects a different "habeas corpus"
remedy.
134. See supra Part I.A. As a practical matter, there is virtually never any need to
use the constitutional writ in contemporary criminal cases because other rules and mechanisms have developed which ensure that an arrestee will be promptly notified of the
charges against him and brought to trial on those charges. See, e.g., FED. R. CraM. P. 5.
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eral claim has a right to have access to a federal forum for the
adjudication of that claim.1"
The short answer to this argument is that the Constitution
itself and historical practice are inconsistent with the existence
of such a right. The constitutional convention was divided on
the question whether lower federal courts should be established,
and accordingly left the matter to Congress's discretion. Since
the Constitution does not require that lower federal courts exist
at all, there can be no right of access to such courts for any particular claim.1 6
In terms of historical practice, the general federal question jurisdiction of the federal courts is a late nineteenth century development. Prior to that time, litigants asserting claims under
the federal Constitution or federal laws were frequently limited
to filing suit in state court, and even today, there are some areas
in which federal causes of action can only be brought in state
court. When litigants currently assert federal defenses or immunities in suits brought in state court, they generally have no
right of removal to federal court, and can obtain a hearing in a
infrequent cases in which the Supreme
federal forum only in the
7
1
Court grants review. 3

In state criminal cases, the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction
was not a general reviewing mechanism with respect to federal
claims prior to the historically recent expansion of the federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction. 1 Currently, if a criminal defendant
is only sentenced to a fine, he has no access to federal habeas
corpus for consideration of his federal claims, since habeas
corpus can only be used to challenge unlawful custody. If a defendant is sentenced to less than a few years in prison, habeas
corpus review is also likely to be barred as a practical matter,
since his sentence will have run its course by the time state remedies are exhausted.
If a defendant has pleaded guilty, a federal habeas court is
generally barred from entertaining a claim of an antecedent violation of a constitutional right under the rule of McMann v.
Richardson and Tollett v. Henderson. In other circumstances,
135. See Bator, The State Courts and Federal ConstitutionalLitigation, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 605, 627-28 & n.57 (1981) (noting and responding to argument).
136. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103 (1980); Bator, supra note 135, at 627-28
& n.57; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 8, at 11-12.
137. See Bator, supra note 135, at 606 n.3; District Court Reorganization:Hearing
on H.R. 5994 and Related Bills before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
48-52 (1984).
138. See supra Part I.C.
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access to a federal forum may be barred by the rule of Stone v.
Powell concerning fourth amendment claims, the "cause and
prejudice" procedural default standard of Wainwright v. Sykes,
or the laches doctrine of habeas corpus rule 9(a).1 39
Thus, the premise of this argument-that there is generally a
right to have a federal forum hear a federal claim-has no basis
in reality. If the argument rests on the more modest assertion
that there are special reasons for providing access to a federal
forum in light of the high stakes involved in criminal cases, then
it must fall back on other arguments that would establish this
underlying assumption. The most common argument on this
point-that federal courts show superior sensitivity and receptiveness to the constitutional claims advanced by criminal defendants-is addressed in the next part.
C. Enforcement Of The Constitution
Perhaps the most common justification offered for the current
habeas corpus jurisdiction is that the federal courts have a superior sensitivity to federal rights and are more receptive than the
state courts to claims based on such rights. Ensuring the adequate protection of constitutional rights for criminal defendants
accordingly requires that review of state court decisions0 on fed4
eral claims be available in the inferior federal courts.1
This argument depends on a questionable empirical generalization about the disposition of the federal courts and the state
courts which is obviously not true in many particular instances,
if it is true at all. Decisions by state courts which define the
rights of defendants more expansively than the decisions of federal courts are not uncommon.' 4 '

Normally, federal habeas

courts reach the same conclusion as the state courts.142 However,
even if it were true that federal courts are generally more likely
to grant defendants' claims, it would not follow that greater fidelity to the Constitution will result from expansive federal
court review.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 79, 119-26.
140. This argument is developed at length in a broader setting in Neuborne, The
Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1105 (1977). A general response appears in Bator,
supra note 135, at 623-35.
141. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HAv. L. REv. 489, 498-501 (1977).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 108-12.
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In its basic provisions, the Constitution establishes a republican form of government under which public policy decisions at
the federal level are made by a legislature accountable to the
public in the enactment of laws and an executive accountable to
the public in their execution. The federal government as a whole
is confined to the exercise of the powers enumerated in the Constitution, and any powers not so delegated "are reserved to the
1 43
States . . . or to the people.9
This general system of self-government is qualified by constitutional provisions establishing various important rights against
the government. Even these provisions, however, reflect a recognition of the need to maintain a fair balance between the individual's right to security against crime and the right of defendants and suspects to be free of governmental abuse or
overreaching. For example, the fourth amendment does not bar
non-consensual searches and seizures in the investigation of
crime, but generally prohibits such activities only if they are unreasonable. The fifth amendment creates no presumption
against obtaining incriminating admissions from a suspect or defendant and using them in prosecution, but only bars compelling
a person to be a witness against himself.' 4" The fifth amendment
also recognizes that the government may properly deprive offenders of life, liberty, and property in furtherance of law enforcement objectives, stipulating only that it may not do so
without due process. The eighth amendment does not bar severe
punishment for serious crimes, or even capital punishment, but
only prohibits punishment that is cruel and unusual. A judge
who erroneously grants a claim by misinterpreting or disregarding the Constitution's limitations on the scope of the rights it
defines departs from the Constitution no less than a judge who
erroneously denies a claim that validly asserts a constitutional
right.
With these considerations in mind, there is little force to the
argument for habeas corpus review based on allegedly superior
federal court sensitivity to constitutional values. It has not been
shown that federal courts are generally more likely than state
courts to respect the Constitution's limitations on judicial overriding of legislative and executive decisions affecting criminal investigation and prosecution. It has also not been shown that federal courts are more likely to respect the Constitution's
limitations on federal authority over state procedures, or the
143.
144.

U.S. CONST. amend. X.
See generally REPORT No. 1, supra note 5, Part L.A, Part II.A.2.b, & Part II.C.1.
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Constitution's limitations on the scope of particular federal
rights that may be applicable in state proceedings. Overall, there
is no particular plausibility to the view that federal habeas
corpus review results in greater fidelity to the Constitution. The
argument to the contrary reflects partisanship for expansive interpretations of selected portions of selected provisions of the
Constitution, rather than a commitment to the Constitution itself. As Professor Paul Bator has observed:
We are told that federal judges will be more receptive to
constitutional values than state judges. What is really
meant, however, is that federal judges will be more receptive to some constitutional values than state judges. And
the hidden assumption of the argument is that the Constitution contains only one or two sorts of values: typically, those which protect the individual from the power
of the state, and those which assure the superiority of
federal to state law.
But the Constitution contains other sorts of values as
well. It gives the federal government powers, but also enacts limitations on those powers. The limitations, too,
count as setting forth constitutionalvalues. Will the federal judge be more sensitive than the state judge in insuring that these limitations are complied with? Whose institutional "set" is likely to make one more sensitive to
the values underlying the tenth amendment? Is a federal
judge likely to be more receptive than the state judge in
honoring other structural principles, such as separation
of powers? Why don't these sorts of issues ever seem to
14
count? 5

D.

The Need For Surrogate Supreme Courts

Another argument for the current habeas corpus jurisdiction
is that the expansion of federal rights and the increase in the
general volume of litigation in recent times has made it impossible for the Supreme Court to maintain an adequate degree of
supervision over the state judiciaries in criminal cases through
direct review. It is accordingly necessary to empower the lower
federal courts to review state criminal judgments-in effect, to
145.

Bator, supra note 135, at 631-34.
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serve as surrogate Supreme Courts-to maintain an adequate reviewing capacity at the federal level.14
Taken in its most obvious sense, this argument presupposes
that extensive day-to-day oversight of the state judiciaries by
federal courts is currently necessary to secure an acceptable degree of compliance with Supreme Court precedent by the state
courts. The weaknesses of this argument are similar to the weaknesses of the argument that habeas corpus review is essential to
securing fidelity to the Constitution. It assumes with no adequate basis that state courts are insufficiently sensitive or receptive to claims of federal right based on Supreme Court precedent, 7 and ignores the full range of constitutional values that
are recognized in the Supreme Court's decisions. Are federal
courts more likely than state courts to implement faithfully the
Supreme Court's decisions limiting judicial authority to override
legislative and executive decisions affecting criminal investigation and prosecution? Are federal courts more likely to respect
the Court's decisions concerning the limits of federal authority
over state procedure, or its decisions concerning the limits on
the scope of particular federal rights that apply in state
proceedings?
Overall, there is no particular plausibility to the view that
habeas corpus review results in greater fidelity to Supreme
Court precedent. Indeed, the Court is regularly required to
devote a portion of its limited time to reviewing and overturning
the decisions of lower federal courts which have erroneously
granted writs of habeas corpus in reviewing state cases.14
A somewhat different version of the "surrogate Supreme
Court" argument holds that habeas corpus review is necessary to
146. See Wright & Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners:The Allocation of Fact-FindingResponsibility, 75 YALE L. J. 895, 897-98 (1966).
147. See Smith, supra note 118, at 149 (unlikelihood under contemporary circumstances of state court misapplication or resistance to Supreme Court precedent); Bator,
supra note 135, at 629-31 (disputing, in relation to habeas corpus review, alleged superiority of federal judges in sensitivity and competence under contemporary conditions);
O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State Courts from the
Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 801, 812-14 (1981) (similar);
Friendly, supra note 70, at 165 n.125 (similar); see also Neuborne, supra note 140, at
1119 ("We are not faced today with widespread state judicial refusal to enforce clear
federal rights.").
148. See Habeas Corpus Reform: Hearing on S. 238 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary,99th Cong., 1st Sess. 52-53 (1985) [hereinafter "1985 Hearing"] (listing of recent decisions in which Supreme Court overturned federal court of appeals decisions
favorable to habeas corpus petitioners). The cited cases include both cases in which the
court of appeals' decision was wrong on the merits and cases in which the court of appeals did not comply with the limitations on habeas corpus review.
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secure uniformity in the interpretation and application of federal law. In this sense, however, the lower federal courts are inherently incapable of serving as surrogate Supreme Courts. Only
the Supreme Court itself can prescribe nationally uniform and
nationally binding caselaw rules. The close to a hundred federal
district courts and twelve regional federal appellate courts can
differ in their decisions concerning matters that the Supreme
Court has not resolved, and their views on such issues are not
binding on the state courts outside of the particular cases
brought up on federal habeas corpus.
Moreover, even in areas in which there is no review of state
judgments in the lower federal courts-e.g., civil litigation-the
state courts are attentive to the opinions of the federal appellate
courts on unsettled questions of federal law, and the conclusions
they reach are likely to fall within the range of options appearing in the decisions of the federal courts of appeals. In general, it
is not apparent that the interest in uniformity is significantly
advanced by habeas corpus review, and not apparent that harmful disparities would occur with any greater frequency if the
state supreme courts had the same latitude as federal appellate
courts to adopt different resolutions and make their own judgments concerning questions that the Supreme Court has left
open.
On a more mundane level, the "surrogate Supreme Court" argument is sometimes raised as a caseload issue. The restriction
or elimination of habeas corpus review, it is argued, would result
in an excessive burden on the Supreme Court's direct review
jurisdiction.
However, the Justices of the Supreme Court do not appear to
share this concern, since a number of them have spoken out
strongly in favor of fundamental restrictions on federal habeas
corpus, and the general trend of the Court's recent decisions has
been to limit the availability of federal habeas corpus. "' 9 Recourse to the Supreme Court on direct review is limited by a
normal sixty day limit under Supreme Court Rule 20, a safeguard against a burdensome volume of applications that is simply lacking in the case of habeas corpus. Moreover, the Supreme
Court is regularly required each term to grant certiorari in a
number of cases to resolve unsettled questions of habeas corpus
procedure or to reverse unsound decisions by federal appellate
149. See S. REP. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 & nn.13-16 (1983) (statements by
Justices critical of habeas corpus); supra Part II.B (recent decisions limiting habeas
corpus).
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courts granting writs of habeas corpus. For the foregoing reasons, there is no adequate basis for believing that limiting or
eliminating federal habeas corpus would result in any net increase in the Supreme Court's caseload.
Finally, it may be noted that the current habeas corpus jurisdiction arose in a period in which the criminal justice systems in
many states were undermined by state-enforced racial segregation. This evil has since been corrected by the civil rights legislation of the 1960s and by the Supreme Court's decisions following
Brown v. Board of Education. In commenting on the import of
these changes for habeas corpus review, Attorney General William French Smith has observed:
The unique historical circumstances obtaining at the
time of the decision of Brown v. Allen may have led the
Supreme Court to see a need for a broad supervisory authority of the lower federal courts over state criminal
proceedings. One may question the validity of perpetuating this authority into a time when the circumstances
1 0
that gave rise to it no longer exist. 5

E. Providing A Vehicle For The Articulation Of
ConstitutionalRights
It is sometimes asserted that habeas corpus proceedings provide an important vehicle for the articulation of constitutional
51
rights by the federal courts.1
In relation to the Supreme Court, this assertion is groundless.
Most of the Court's important decisions in the past thirty years
concerning constitutional criminal procedure have been made in
direct review cases. While some important issues have fortuitously been addressed in the context of habeas corpus litigation,
the same issues could have been considered and decided in cases
coming up on direct review. In relation to the federal courts of
150. Smith, supra note 118, at 149; see Bator, supra note 135, at 631 ("the argument
seems to me to derive primarily from a special historical experience, involving the division of the country on the issue of racial segregation, which is no longer of dominating
significance in governing the attitudes of state court judges"); see also Neuborne, supra
note 140, at 1119 n.55 ("The widespread breakdown of Southern justice which motivated
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 . . .and similar breakdowns during the height
of the civil rights movement which provoked calls for significant expansions of federal
jurisdiction . . .do not exist today.").
151. See 1985 Hearing, supra note 148, at 41, 52 (argument and response).
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appeals, most rulings by these courts on constitutional questions
occur in the context of appeals from convictions in federal prosecutions. Habeas corpus review does sometimes enable federal
appellate courts to pass on the constitutionality of unique features of state procedure that have no counterpart in federal proceedings, where the proper resolution on the basis of Supreme
Court precedent is unclear. However, unless some other argument establishes that the decisions of federal appellate courts on
these unsettled questions are likely to be "better" than those of
state supreme courts, there is no particular value in having lower
federal courts "articulate" the relevant rules.
F.

CorrectingInjustices

Another argument is that habeas corpus review is needed to
correct miscarriages of justice occurring in state proceedings.' 5 2
A first problem with this argument is that habeas corpus review is a very poorly suited means to this end. Guilt and innocence, as such, are not in issue in habeas corpus litigation; only
violations of constitutional rights can be asserted. A federal
habeas court may overturn a state conviction on the basis of a
constitutional violation that does not cast any doubt on the factual accuracy of the verdict. Conversely, even conclusive proof of
innocence does not support the issuance of a writ, in the absence
of constitutional violations in the state proceedings. As a practical matter, it is not federal habeas corpus, but the various remedies available to defendants at the state level that provide the
153
essential vehicle for the correction of miscarriages of justice.
A second problem with this argument is that it fails to address
the question of limits. There is no limit in principle to the number of layers of review that can be piled on top of each other. If
fifty levels of mandatory review were added to those now available, no doubt each additional level might detect and correct
some potential injustice that had gotten by at all earlier stages.
However, unless it is maintained that every prisoner should be
given a trial de novo whenever he wants one, there is an unavoidable need to make the judgment that the costs of permitting
54
additional re-litigation at some point outweigh its benefits.
The infrequency with which relief is granted and the dearth of
152.
153.
154.

See Bator, supra note 135, at 613-14 n. 25 (noting and responding to argument).
See 1985 Hearing, supra note 148, at 45-46.
See Bator, supra note 135, at 614 & n.27.
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cases in recent years in which demonstrated injustices have been
corrected through habeas corpus " " tend to support the conclusion that the existing habeas corpus jurisdiction goes well beyond that point. In general, it is assumed that one appeal as of
right strikes the proper balance. Habeas corpus review provides
far more than that.
Finally, in assessing the force of this argument, it must be
kept in mind that justice is due to the actual and potential victims of crime, and to society at large, as well as to suspects and
defendants. Injustice occurs when the convictions of criminals
are overturned after the lapse of time has made retrial impossible. Injustice also occurs when the anguish of crime victims and
their families is prolonged for years or decades by continued litigation and the prospect that the person who has ruined their
lives may yet be set free to claim other victims. The open-ended
review of state judgments by federal habeas corpus, extending
far past the conclusion of the normal adjudicatory process, carries particularly acute risks of causing such injustices. 15e
G. Effects On The Behavior Of Prisoners
It is sometimes asserted that engaging in habeas corpus litigation provides valuable "recreational therapy" for prisoners, relieving the tensions generated by the prison environment and
157
helping to keep them occupied.

While it is true that some prisoners who spend their time preparing and litigating habeas corpus petitions may be diverted
from other harmful activities-e.g., assaulting other inmates or
engaging in drug abuse-it must also be recognized that frivolous and harassing litigation is itself a seriously antisocial activity that carries substantial costs to the system. More basically,
viewing emotional gratification to petitioners as an independent
ground for authorizing habeas corpus review presupposes a view
of the federal courts as a kind of video arcade for bored prisoners who should be free to toy with the system in order to keep
them out of worse sorts of trouble. This is irreconcilable with the
proper view of courts as impartial organs of the law whose func155.
156.

See supra text accompanying notes 108-12.
Some cases illustrating these points are described in the Appendix to this

Report.
157. Cf. C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Jurisdiction § 4261, at 588 (1978) ("prisoners thrive on it as a form of occupational
therapy").
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tion is to entertain genuine claims of legal right and accurately
resolve them.
This argument also assumes that engaging in habeas corpus
litigation will in fact improve the attitudes of prisoners and
lessen their disposition to commit antisocial acts. However, the
view is widely held by judges and writers that it has the opposite
effect. Like other forms of litigation, habeas corpus litigation
provides prisoners with a cost-free means of striking at the system and gaining increased esteem among fellow inmates. The
more specific message of permitting endless challenges to convictions and sentences is that the system never really regards the
prisoner's guilt as an established fact, and that he need never
accept and deal with it. While the ability to command the time
and attention of judges and prosecutors by filing a petition may
be gratifying to many prisoners, any positive "recreational"
value of this practice must be balanced against its potential effect of increasing the arrogance of unrepentant criminals. As
Professor Bator has observed:
A procedural system which permits an endless repetition
of inquiry into facts and law in a vain search for ultimate
certitude implies a lack of confidence about the possibility of justice that cannot but war with the effectiveness
of the underlying substantive commands. . . . The first
step in achieving [rehabilitation] may be a realization by
the convict that he is justly subject to sanction . . . and a
process of reeducation cannot, perhaps, even begin if we
make sure that the cardinal moral predicate is missing, if
society itself continuously tells the convict that he may
not be justly subject to reeducation and treatment in the
first place. The idea of just condemnation lies at the
heart of the criminal law, and we should not lightly cre58
ate processes which implicitly belie its possibility.

H.

Other Arguments

Other arguments are also occasionally offered in support of
habeas corpus review. For example, it is said that habeas corpus
provides a necessary means for securing a relatively detached
158. Bator, supra note 25, at 452; see Spalding v. Aiken, 460 U.S. 1093, 1096-97
(1983) (statement of Burger, C.J.); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 262 (1973)
(Powell, J., concurring); Friendly, supra note 70, at 146.
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and "isolated" consideration of a defendant's federal claims, free
of the multiplicity of issues and factual complications that characterize earlier stages of litigation. This argument would be
more convincing if there were no appellate courts in the states.
In fact, however, the federal habeas court's review is typically a
revisiting of claims that have already received detached consideration, in a setting isolated from the exigencies of trial litigation, in the course of the prisoner's appeals in the state court
system.
Another argument is that habeas corpus review of state judgments fosters a constructive "dialogue" between state and federal courts concerning the issues that arise in habeas corpus litigation.159 However, habeas corpus is not needed to create such a
dialogue. In the absence of habeas corpus review, prosecutors
and defense attorneys in criminal cases would continue to cite
both state and federal precedents supporting their positions, and
the judges of each system would continue to consider the views
of their counterparts in the other system in the ordinary course
of litigation. To the extent that habeas corpus does foster a federal-state dialogue, it is not a dialogue of equals, but of superior
and inferior. It is the federal habeas court that gets the final
word on the disposition of the particular case under review, and
the state courts within its domain may depart from its views
only at the risk of having their judgments overturned in other
cases that turn on the same issue. 6 ' Unless some other reason
can be given for subordinating the highest courts of the states to
the lower federal courts in this manner, the desirability of "dialogue" on these unequal terms is less than obvious.
IV.

REFORM OPTIONS

The review of history and policy in the earlier sections of this
report shows that the statutory habeas corpus remedy in its contemporary character is unrelated to the historical and constitutional functions of the Great Writ. 61 In its specific operation it
159. See Cover & Aleinikoff, DialecticalFederalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court,
86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977).
160. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 159, is accordingly wrong in stating that the
Warren Court's innovations have resulted in "a dialogue on the future of constitutional
requirements in criminal law in which state and federal courts were required both to
speak and listen as equals." Id. at 1036. The situation in habeas corpus would be equalized only if state trial judges were given the authority to overturn the judgments of the
federal courts in federal criminal cases.
161. See supra Part I.A.
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is inconsistent with basic principles of adjudicatory procedure
that are taken for granted in other contexts. 6 ' The arguments
typically offered in support of the current jurisdiction generally
reflect partisanship for defense interests-regardless of countervailing public interests and the actual balance of interests struck
by the Constitution-or an unjustified preference for aggrandizing the lower federal courts at the expense of the state judiciaries, or some combination of these two biases.' 8
At the level of terminology, it might be beneficial to adopt
some different name for the current review jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts in relation to state judgments-e.g., re-styling state prisoners' challenges to their convictions and sentences
as applications for "a writ of federal review" rather than petitions for "a writ of habeas corpus." This would provide a characterization that accurately reflects the nature of the existing jurisdiction. It might help curb the confusion between that
jurisdiction and the traditional Great Writ which chronically impedes clear thinking in this area and is routinely exploited by
opponents of needed reforms.
At the level of substantive reform, various options may be
considered. The affirmative case for adopting such reforms to
curb the contemporary abuse of habeas corpus was aptly summarized by Attorney General William French Smith in an article
published in 1983:
First, the availability of habeas corpus to state prisoners, beyond the various remedies and layers of review
available in the state courts, has little or no value in
avoiding injustices or ensuring that the federal rights of
criminal defendants are respected. The state prisoners
who seek federal habeas corpus are generally among the
least deserving element of the prison population. ...
[Tihe typical habeas corpus applicant is challenging his
imprisonment for a seriously violent crime for which he
was convicted after trial. The typical applicant has already secured extensive review of his case in the state
courts, having pursued a state appeal and also often having initiated collateral attacks in the state courts on one
or more occasions. . . . There is no reason to believe that
the state courts' consideration of the claims of defend162.
163.

See supra text accompanying notes 115-16, 129-31.
See supra text accompanying notes 129-60.
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ants who subsequently seek federal habeas corpus is deficient in any significant number of cases ....
Second, the present system of review is demeaning to
the state courts and pointlessly disparaging to their efforts to comply with federal law in criminal proceedings
S. ..

This difficulty is aggravated by the particular pro-

cedures and rules of review that are presently employed
in habeas corpus proceedings. A single federal judge is
frequently placed in the position of reviewing a judgment
of conviction that was entered by a state trial judge, reviewed and found unobjectionable by a state appellate
court, and upheld by a state supreme court ....
Third, the current system of federal habeas corpus
defeats the important objective of establishing at some
point an end to litigation. A prisoner may seek federal
habeas corpus many years after the normal conclusion of
state criminal proceedings. The lapse of time and the resulting disappearance of evidence and witnesses may
render response to the applicant's contentions-or retrial
in the event that he prevails on his claims-difficult or
impossible. ...

Fourth, the current system is wasteful of limited resources. At a time when both state and federal courts
face staggering criminal caseloads, we can ill afford to
make large commitments of judicial and prosecutorial resources to procedures of dubious value in furthering the
ends of criminal justice. Such commitments are necessarily at the expense of the time available for the stages of
the criminal process at which the questions of guilt and
innocence and basic fairness are most directly addressed. .

.

. The time spent on habeas corpus applica-

tions in federal courts is a particularly questionable indulgence. As noted earlier, the matters raised in such
applications have, in general, already been considered
and decided by the state courts. All too often the contentions raised reflect only the imaginings of idle prisoners
who turn to "writ-writing" as a means of diversion or
continued aggression against society. .

..

A fifth and final criticism is that the present system of
habeas corpus review creates particularly acute problems
in capital cases. .

.

. It . . . prevents correction of the

practical nullification of all capital punishment legisla-
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tion that has resulted from litigational delay and
obstruction. '"
On the basis of the foregoing considerations, Attorney General
Smith concluded that "the most effective response to the
problems resulting from federal habeas corpus for state convicts
would be the elimination of federal habeas corpus in that
area."'" We agree. This reform option will be discussed in the
initial part of subsection A of this section, followed by discussions of other legislative reform options. These include the option of confining federal habeas corpus review to cases where a
meaningful process for considering a petitioner's federal claims
was denied in the state courts, and the option of enacting limited reform legislation like that passed by the Senate in 1984.
Subsection B examines the possibility of achieving reforms
through litigation.
A. Legislative Options
1. Abolition of Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners
Having reviewed the history of habeas corpus from its common law origins to its contemporary operation, and having fully
considered the relevant policy issues, we agree with Attorney
General Smith that "the simple abolition of federal habeas
corpus for state criminal convicts" would be "[tihe most
straightforward solution to the tensions, burdens, and inefficiencies presently resulting from federal habeas corpus."' 6 A provision that would have had this effect was included in Title II of
the proposed Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968.167 The same effect could be achieved by a simpler formulation along the following lines:
No court of the United States other than the Supreme
Court, and no judge of a court of the United States, shall
have jurisdiction to entertain any challenge to the validity of a person's detention pursuant to the judgment of a
164. Smith, supra note 118, at 142-46.
165. Id. at 149-50.
166. Id. at 147-48.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 94-97.
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state court, or to the execution of any other sentence imposed by a state court.
For reasons discussed earlier, there can be no doubt concerning the constitutionality of this type of reform. It would have no
effect whatsoever on the Great Writ whose suspension is prohibited by the Constitution.1 6
Eliminating federal habeas corpus for state prisoners also
would "not upset any deep-seated tradition or historically sanctioned practice."' 169 The First Judiciary Act's general restriction
of federal habeas corpus to federal prisoners remained operative
until the enactment of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, and even
thereafter, the availability of federal habeas corpus to state prisoners remained largely a theoretical matter prior to the past
thirty years. Its elimination would be limited in substantial effect to practices that have emerged since the 1950s. e
A reform of this sort would also not restrict or impair the
traditional, constitutionally-based mechanism for maintaining
the supremacy and uniformity of federal law through direct review of the judgments of the highest courts of the states by the
Supreme Court. State convicts would retain the right to seek Supreme Court review, in addition to having access to the appellate and collateral review mechanisms provided in the state
court systems.'
A final point in support of this approach is that Congress has
already effectively abolished federal habeas corpus in one substantial jurisdiction-the District of Columbia-with no discernible adverse effect on the quality or fairness of criminal proceedings.172 This naturally raises the question why the same
approach should not be tried in relation to the substantially similar judicial systems of the states. Judge Carl McGowan has
observed:
A matter that has rankled relations between state and
federal courts for some years now is the collateral attack
168. See supra Part I.A and Part III.A; The Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1982:
Hearing on S. 2216 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
103-07 (1982) (opinion of Office of Legal Counsel).
169. Smith, supra note 118, at 147-48.
170. See supra Parts I.B.-C.
171. The fact that state prisoners would not always have access to a federal forum for
consideration of their federal claims is not objectionable either on constitutional grounds
or as a matter of policy. Such access is frequently not available even under the current
system of review. See supra Parts II.A.-H; Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 102-03 (1980).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
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on final state criminal convictions provided by Congress
in the federal courts. A state prisoner who has unsuccessfully exhausted his avenues of state trial and appellate
relief can, even many years later when retrial is not practically feasible, attack that conviction in the federal district court as violative of federal law, and procure his release if such a violation is established. Since the same
claim of federal law violation can [be], and often is, made
in the trial and appellate courts of the state, with certiorari review available in the Supreme Court, the state
judges understandably have some difficulty in seeing why
their work should be reexamined in the federal courts
whenever a colorable claim of violation is alleged.
The one place where this cannot be done is in the District of Columbia . . . . Some twelve years ago Congress
enacted a comprehensive reorganization of both the local
and federal courts in the District.
In doing . . . this, the Congress . . . provided in the
D.C. Code for collateral attack upon a D.C. criminal conviction to be made in the new and improved D.C. court
system. It explicitly declared, however, that no further
collateral challenge could be made in the federal courts
in the District of Columbia. Thus it is that for some years
now, although a state prisoner across the Potomac in Virginia, or one over the line in Maryland, has a second
chance for collateral review of his conviction in the federal courts in those states, a state prisoner in the District
of Columbia does not.
. . [[T]he Supreme Court ultimately held that Congress could constitutionally make the choice it did, articulating that result in terms which would appear to give
Congress the same latitude to end in all of the states collateral attack by state prisoners in the federal courts.
There have been no reports, so far as I am aware, of egregious injustices to District of Columbia prisoners because
of this denial of state habeas jurisdiction in the federal
courts. . ..
The early finality of criminal convictions is generally
desirable, and especially so when that can be assured
without duplication of judicial effort. The resources of
the federal courts at the present time are strained by
their own criminal caseloads. They should not have to exercise a supervisory authority over the administration of
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state criminal laws unless that is plainly necessary in the
interest of justice.
Certainly there appears to have been a steadily increasing sensitivity by state judges to claims of federal
right-a sensitivity that can only be frustrated by needless subjection to second-guessing by federal judges.
Since Congress has in effect made the District of Columbia a laboratory for testing the need for federal collateral
attack by state prisoners, the Congress would do well to
study carefully the actual results of that experiment. If it
turns out to be positive, then the opportunity exists to
eliminate simultaneously a significant number of cases
has always
from the federal courts and a condition which
1 78
relations.
federal-state
of
waters
roiled the

2. Deference to Adequate State Processes
A second reform option would be to limit the scope of review
on federal habeas corpus to the question whether adequate
processes were provided in the state courts for considering the
petitioner's federal claims. While formulations of this approach
could vary considerably in detail, the basic idea would be to
treat federal habeas corpus as a backstop measure, which would
only come into play if a state judicial system had failed to provide some meaningful opportunity for raising a federal claim
and having it decided. This was, in part, the approach taken in
the Judicial Conference's proposal that was passed twice by the
House of Representatives in the 1950s.174
This approach would essentially restore habeas corpus to the
function it fulfilled in the intermediate period of its expansion,
between the decision in Moore v. Dempsey in 1923 and the creation of a quasi-appellate habeas corpus jurisdiction by Brown v.
Allen and related decisions. 175 It would amount to a general application of the current approach to review of fourth amendment
173. McGowan, The View From an Inferior Court, 19 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 659, 667-69
(1982).
174. The Judicial Conference proposal would have barred access to federal habeas
corpus with respect to claims that had actually been determined in the state courts or
that could still be raised and determined in the state courts, but otherwise would have
permitted access to federal habeas corpus if there had been no "fair and adequate opportunity" to raise a claim and have it determined in state proceedings. See supra text
accompanying note 85.
175. See supra Part I.C.2.

SPRING AND SUMMER 1989]

Habeas Corpus

claims in habeas corpus proceedings under the rule of Stone v.
Powell, which bars re-litigation so long as a "full and fair opportunity" for litigating the claim was provided in the state
courts.' Justice O'Connor has advocated the general application of this type of standard:
If our nation's bifurcated judicial system is to be retained, as I am sure it will be, it is clear that we should
strive to make both the federal and the state systems
strong, independent, and viable. State courts will undoubtedly continue in the future to litigate federal constitutional questions. State judges in assuming office take
an oath to support the federal as well as the state constitution. State judges do in fact rise to the occasion when
given the responsibility and opportunity to do so. It is a
step in the right direction to defer to the state courts and
give finality to their judgments on federal constitutional
questions where a full and fair adjudication has been
17
given in the state court.

Another way of looking at this reform is as an application of
normal res judicata principles in habeas corpus proceedings. In
general, a litigant who has unsuccessfully asserted a claim in a
state proceeding is not free to litigate the same claim over again
in federal court. This principle was explicitly affirmed by the Supreme Court in Allen v. McCurry, 8 which held that rejection of
a constitutional claim in a state criminal proceeding estops the
defendant from asserting the same claim in a later section 1983
suit in federal court, so long as the state proceedings provided a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim.
This approach to habeas corpus reform has sometimes been
defended as superior to the abolition approach on the ground
that it would ensure the existence of some means of creating an
evidentiary record on a claim for purposes of Supreme Court review, and that it would preserve an incentive for state courts to
79
provide fair procedures for the consideration of federal claims.1
However, the force of the record-for-review point is not great in
the contemporary period, in light of the fact that state proceed176. See supra text accompanying notes 125-26.
177. O'Connor, supra note 147, at 814-15.
178. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
179. See supra text accompanying notes 89-96 (Judicial Conference reform proposal
designed in part to ensure means of creating record for Supreme Court review). Cf. Bator, supra note 25, at 455-60 (favorable assessment of some review of adequacy of state
process).
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ings do currently provide ample means for raising the full range
of federal claims that may be asserted by defendants.1 80 There is
also no reason to believe that the state judicial systems now require a special "incentive," beyond the traditional availability of
direct review of state judgments in the Supreme Court, to provide fair processes for the consideration of defendants' claims.
Conversely, preserving habeas corpus review under an adequacy-of-state-process standard has some unattractive features.
Since the enjoyment of habeas corpus litigation by state prisoners is not wholly dependent on a realistic possibility of success,
litigation would continue in this area by prisoners alleging that
they had been denied fair state processes for considering their
claims, and a substantial amount of work could be required in
disposing of these petitions. Basic restrictions on the federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction would also predictably elicit from
some federal courts and judges the normal resistance of government institutions to new constraints on their power. The preservation of review of the availability, "adequacy," or "fairness" of
state proceedings could accordingly provide a basis for eroding
or diluting these restrictions.
In general, however, this approach would constitute a fundamental improvement over the pointless redundancy of the current system, though not as clean and complete a solution as the
simple abolition of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners. Its
optimal formulation would be a narrow provision preserving federal habeas review only where a state system provides no means
by which a federal claim can be raised or could have been raised
in the course of the state process. 8"
3.

Limited Reform Legislation

A final reform option would not attempt to make basic
changes in the character of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, but would focus instead on correcting particular problems
of abuse or excess that arise under the current system of review.
180. Cf. P. ROBINSON, supra note 105, at 22 (habeas corpus applications normally decided on basis of evidentiary record of state proceedings and submissions of parties).
181. Cf. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (unclear whether claim cognizable
under any state remedy, where petitioner alleged that conviction was solely based on
prosecution's use of perjury and that the factual basis of the claim could not have been
discovered through reasonable diligence prior to his new trial motion and state appeal);
Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (regarding provisions of D.C. Code and
28 U.S.C. § 2255 limiting potential availability of habeas corpus to cases where other
remedies are inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of detention).
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Legislation containing a set of limited reform proposals of this
type has been under consideration by Congress since 1982.
These measures, which have the support of the Administration,
the Conference of (State) Chief Justices, the National Association of Attorneys General, the National District Attorneys Association, and the National Governors Association, were passed by
the Senate in 1984. They have recently been transmitted by the
President to Congress again as Title II of the proposed Criminal
Justice Reform Act (S. 1970 and H.R. 3777).182 The proposals
included four specific reforms.
First, there is currently no time limit on habeas corpus applications. As noted earlier, ' sa this approach reflects a failure of the
procedures associated with federal habeas corpus to keep pace
with its expanding scope, and constitutes a departure from normal principles of finality that would not be countenanced in connection with any other appellate mechanism. As Justice Powell
has observed:
Another cause of overload of the federal system is [28
U.S.C.] § 2254, conferring federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to review state court criminal convictions. There is
no statute of limitations, and no finality of federal review
of state convictions. Thus, repetitive recourse is commonplace. I know of no other system of justice structured in a
way that assures no end to the litigation of a criminal
conviction. Our practice in this respect is viewed with
disbelief by lawyers and judges in other countries. Nor
does the Constitution require this sort of redundancy.8 "
The specific corrective proposed in the legislation is a oneyear limitation period on habeas corpus applications, normally
running from exhaustion of state remedies. The start of the limitation period would be deferred in case a state unlawfully prevented filing, and in connection with newly recognized rights
and newly discovered claims.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102; Comprehensive Crime Control Act
of 1983: Hearings on S. 829 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 226-27, 235-36, 287-88, 309-11, 1111-12
(1983). The formal resolution of the National Governors Association endorsed the basic
recommendations of an earlier but generally similar set of reform proposals. Id. at 23536. Cf. Habeas Corpus Procedures Amendments Act of 1981: Hearing on S. 653 before
the Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1981) (earlier reform bill).
183. See supra text accompanying notes 129-31.
184. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Address Before the American Bar Association Division
of Judicial Administration (Aug. 9, 1982).
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This reform would create an important check on the interminable continuation of litigation that characterizes the current
system of review. It is, however, quite generous in comparison
with the time limits on other federal appellate remedies in its
normal starting point, duration, and exceptions. By way of comparison, a federal defendant must normally decide whether to
appeal within 10 days of conviction, and a state defendant seeking Supreme Court review must normally apply within 60 days
of affirmance of his conviction by the highest state court. Even a
federal defendant who seeks a new trial on grounds of newly discovered evidence must apply within two years of final judgment.
As the Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the reform legislation observed,
[tihe last-mentioned limitation has the particularly curious effect that a Federal prisoner who discovers proof Of
his innocence more than two years after final judgment
has no judicial remedy, but must seek executive clemency, while a State or Federal prisoner who asserts violations of Constitutional rights which may cast no real
doubt on his guilt is afforded a Federal judicial remedy
without limitation of time. The time limitation rule...
would reduce this discrepancy, bringing the availability
of [habeas corpus] into closer conformity with the approach taken by Federal law in other contexts to maintenance of orderly procedures and assurance of finality in
criminal adjudication.18
The second major reform proposed in the legislation is a general narrowing and simplification of the standard of review.
Under the current system, state court fact-finding is presumed
to be correct (subject to potential rebuttal by "convincing evidence") if a number of conditions set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
are satisfied, but the federal habeas court is required to make an
independent determination of questions of law and to apply the
law independently to the facts.186 This can result in the overturning of a judgment-following the passage of years and affirmance by the appellate courts of the state-though the federal habeas court recognizes that the decision turns on close or
185. S. REP. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-10, 16-18 (1983). The legislation would
also create a comparable time limit on § 2255 motions by federal prisoners. See id. at 3031.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 63-69.
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unsettled questions on which courts may reasonably differ and
on which the federal courts themselves may disagree. It can also
require -hair-splitting decisions whether a state determination is
purely one of fact or reflects an application of law to fact, since
the review standard for factual questions (deference allowed if
several conditions are satisfied) differs from the standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact (re-adjudication uniformly mandated). The legislation would correct these problems
and others by establishing a relatively simple and uniform review standard under which the federal habeas court would generally defer to the state determination of a claim if it concluded
that that determination was reasonable in its resolution of legal
and factual issues and was arrived at by procedures consistent

with due process.187
A third reform in the legislation is a codification of the
caselaw standards for excusing procedural defaults in habeas
corpus proceedings. This would bring greater definiteness and
clarity to the law in this area and make it clear that the properly
restrictive standards that the Supreme Court has developed
since Wainwright v. Sykes apply to all types of defaults.18 8
Finally, the reform legislation incorporates two reforms of a
more technical nature that would reduce the redundancy and
inefficiency of habeas corpus litigation. It would provide that a
federal habeas court can deny a petition on the merits despite
the petitioner's failure to exhaust state remedies. This would
avoid the waste of time and judicial resources that currently results when a prisoner presenting a hopeless petition to a federal
court is sent back to the state courts to exhaust state remedies.
The legislation would also vest the authority to issue certificates
of probable cause for appeal in habeas corpus proceedings exclusively in the judges of the courts of appeals. This would avoid
the waste of time and effort that now occurs when a court of
appeals is required to hear an appeal on a district judge's certifi187.

See S. REP. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7, 22-28 (1983).

188. See id. at 7-8, 12-16, 30. In Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-92 (1986), the
Supreme Court effectively endorsed the definition of the "cause and prejudice" standard
proposed in the reform legislation, expressing confidence that this standard would generally be adequate to guard against injustices. However, the Court indicated that a procedural default should also be excused "in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional
violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent." Id. at
495-96. This additional ground for excusing defaults has been incorporated into the most
recent version of the reform proposals, transmitted by the President to Congress as Title
II of the proposed Criminal Justice Reform Act.
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cation, though it believes that the certificate was improvidently
granted."'
B.

Litigative Options

The Supreme Court, in its current habeas corpus jurisprudence, has shown a sensitivity to interests of finality, federalism,
and effective law enforcement that were simply shrugged off or
discounted in the caselaw of the 1960s. For example, Justice
O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Engle v. Isaac observed:
Collateral review of a conviction extends the ordeal of
trial for both society and the accused. As Justice Harlan
once observed, "[b]oth the individual criminal defendant
and society have an interest in insuring that there will at
some point be the certainty that comes with an end to
litigation, and that attention will ultimately be focused
not on whether conviction was free from error but rather
on whether the prisoner can be restored to a useful place
in the community . . ." By frustrating these interests,
the writ undermines the usual principles of finality of
litigation.
Liberal allowance of the writ, moreover, degrades the
prominence of the trial itself. A criminal trial concentrates society's resources at one "time and place in order
to decide, within the limits of human fallibility, the question of guilt or innocence . . . ." Our Constitution and
laws surround the trial with a multitude of protections
for the accused. Rather than enhancing these safeguards,
ready availability of habeas corpus may diminish their
sanctity ....
Finally,. . . [t]he States possess primary authority for
defining and enforcing the criminal law. In criminal trials
they also hold the initial responsibility for vindicating
constitutional rights. Federal intrusions into state criminal trials frustrate both the State's sovereign power to
punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor
constitutional rights.1 9
189. See S. REP. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, 18-19, 21-22 (1983). Following a
recommendation of Judge Friendly, the legislation would also create a certificate of probable cause requirement for appeals by federal prisoners in § 2255 motion proceedings.
See Friendly, supra note 70, at 144 n.9.
190. 456 U.S. 107, 126-28 (1982).
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In line with these views, the Court has generally been receptive to limitations on the availability of federal habeas corpus
for state prisoners, to the extent that such restrictions are consistent with existing statutory standards and can be carried out
in a principled manner."' While the potential gains through litigation are realistically more limited than those that might be
achieved through legislation, some significant possibilities remain open in this area. Three examples-relating to deference
to adequate state processes, the standard for excusing procedural defaults, and dismissal of unreasonably delayed petitions-will be discussed in the remainder of this part.
1. Applying the Stone v. Powell Standard to Other Claims
In Stone v. Powell " the Supreme Court adopted a rule of
deference to state processes which generally precludes consideration of fourth amendment claims in federal habeas corpus proceedings.19 3 The Court noted that the exclusionary rule for
fourth amendment violations is not a constitutional right, but a
judicially created remedy designed to deter such violations. Considering the high cost to the truth-finding process of excluding
reliable and probative evidence of guilt, and the negligible contribution that applying the exclusionary rule in federal habeas
corpus proceedings would make to its deterrent effect, the Court
held that fourth amendment claims would not be subject to
habeas corpus review so long as there was a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate the claim in state proceedings.
However, in Rose v. Mitchell, 94 the Court declined to apply
the same deferential standard to habeas review of claims of racial discrimination in grand jury selection, though such
claims-like fourth amendment claims-do not bear on the reliability of the verdict reached at trial. In reaching this result, the
Court emphasized the long-standing historical practice of regarding such claims as grounds for the reversal of a conviction,
and the fact that state judges in entertaining such claims are
effectively required to judge their own actions in administering
the grand jury system. In another case, Jackson v. Virginia,1 9
the Court rejected the application of the Stone v. Powell stan191. See supra Part II.B.
192. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
193. See supra text accompanying notes 125-26.
194. 443 U.S. 545, 559-64 (1979).
195. 443 U.S. 307, 321-24 (1979).

-
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dard to a claim that the evidence was insufficient to support a
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, noting that "[t]he
question whether a defendant has been convicted upon inadequate evidence is central to the basic question of guilt or innocence." Finally, in Kimmelman v. Morrison,1 the Court rejected application of the Stone v. Powell standard to a claim of
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to pursue a fourth amendment claim in a timely
manner. The Court relied primarily on the fact that the incompetence claim related to the denial of a constitutional right of
the defendant rather than to the application of a judicially created remedy, and on the view that the possibility of raising or
litigating such a claim in state proceedings is limited in light of a
defendant's dependence on his attorney.
The reasoning in these decisions indicates that the applicability of the Stone v. Powell standard to other types of claims does
not depend on any single consideration, but may be influenced
by various factors. They suggest that the following factors would
weigh in favor of applying the Stone v. Powell standard to a
claim: (1) the type of violation asserted in the claim generally
does not implicate the factual accuracy of a petitioner's conviction, (2) the claim relates to alleged violations of rights by law
enforcement officers, as opposed to violations occurring in proceedings under judicial control, (3) the claim relates to the application of an evidence-exclusion sanction for such violations,
(4) there is no deep-seated historical practice of overturning convictions on the basis of the type of violation asserted in the
claim, and (5) there is no intrinsic difficulty in raising or litigating the type of violation asserted in the claim in state
proceedings.
Applying these factors, a strong case can be made for applying
the Stone v. Powell standard to claims that voluntary statements obtained by the police from suspects should be excluded
on the basis of alleged Miranda violations.'9 A good case can
also be made, considering the same factors, for applying the
Stone v. Powell standard to claims that voluntary statements
196. 477 U.S. 365 (1986).
197. The Miranda procedures and the related rule of evidence exclusion are not constitutional requirements, but prophylactic measures created in 1966 to guard against unconstitutional coercion by police officers in custodial interrogation. In the absence of actual coercion, the use at trial of a defendant's voluntary statements obtained in violation
of Miranda would generally raise no question concerning the accuracy of the conviction.
Miranda claims can be raised and litigated in state proceedings as readily as fourth
amendment exclusionary rule claims. See generally REPORT No. 1, supra note 5, Part
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made to undercover operatives or the police should be excluded

on the basis of Massiah (pretrial right to counsel) violations.'"
2. Clarifying the Scope of the Procedural Default Standard
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the "cause and
prejudice" standard of Wainwright v. Sykes'" generally applies
to failures to raise particular claims at trial or on appeal. However, the Court has reserved the question whether it applies to
the decision to forego an appeal entirely, or whether the stan200 If
dard of Fay v. Noia continues to govern in that context.
Wainwright v. Sykes applies, a defendant could generally raise a
claim that he forfeited at the state level by a failure to appeal
only if he could establish that the failure to pursue an appeal
resulted from constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. If
it does not, then the belated raising of such claims on federal
habeas corpus could be barred only if the defendant "deliberately bypassed" a state appeal.
A strong argument can be made that the "cause and
prejudice" standard should apply across the board, particularly
when one considers that even the virtually complete default of
potential claims that results from pleading guilty is currently assessed under this type of standard under the rule of McMann v.
Richardson and Toilet v. Henderson.01 In arguing for this approach, the Committee Report on the reform legislation that was
passed by the Senate in 1984 observed:
II.C.1 & Part IV.A; Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 n.11 (1977) (applicability of
Stone v.Powell standard to Miranda claims not addressed).
A number of federal circuits have declined to extend the Stone v. Powell standard to
the review of Miranda claims. However, the refusal in each case has apparently been
based on the fact that the Supreme Court has not yet made such an extension, and has
involved no effort to analyze the issue. See Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870, 872 n.3
(5th Cir. en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860 (1980); Patterson v. Warden, 624 F.2d 69
(9th Cir. 1980); Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d 1185, 1189 (2d Cir. 1978); see also Hinman v. McCarthy, 676 F.2d 343, 348-349 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1048 (1982)
(following Patterson, supra).
198. See generally REPORT No. 3, supra note 5; Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 450 n.
7 (1984) (applicability of Stone v. Powell standard to Massiah-type claim not addressed);
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 413-14 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring) (applicability of
Stone v. Powell standard to fifth and sixth amendment claims analogous to fourth
amendment claims is an open question).
199. See supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
200. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492 (1986).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 119-20.

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 22:3 & 4

The Committee believes that it is preferable to employ
the 'cause and prejudice' standard as the exclusive standard governing the excuse of procedural defaults in
habeas corpus proceedings . . . . [Ift is sufficiently flexible to give appropriate weight to [relevant] distinctions
Insofar as decisions normally committed to the
....
personal choice of the defendant [e.g., appeal] tend to be
of basic importance to the further conduct of a case, poor
advice by counsel in relation to such decisions is more
likely to render his assistance Constitutionally ineffective, providing 'cause' ....
In practical terms, decisions normally committed to
the personal choice of the defendant that may result in
the forfeiture of Federal claims are likely to be the decision whether to plead guilty and the decision whether to
pursue an appeal. The effect of the decision to plead
guilty on access to Federal habeas corpus is already governed by special caselaw rules, focusing on the effectiveness of counsel's assistance, . . . and would not be
changed by enactment of the bill. The decision concerning appeal can also be appropriately handled under this
type of standard. If an 'effectiveness of counsel' standard
is adequately protective of defendants' interests in connection with guilty pleas-which normally result in forfeiture of the possibility of raising Federal claims both at
trial and on appeal-such a standard would also seem adequately protective in connection with decisions not to
appeal, which only result in forfeiture of the possibility of
raising Federal claims on appeal. 02

3.

Strengthening the Interpretation of the Laches Rule

Rule 9(a) of the habeas corpus procedural rules provides
roughly that unreasonably delayed habeas corpus petitions may
be dismissed if the state has been prejudiced in its ability to
respond by the delay. 0 3 Rule 9(a) is not, and by its nature cannot be, a satisfactory substitute for a normal time limitation
rule. It differs from the limitation rules of other criminal law
202.
203.

S. REP. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1983).
See supra text accompanying note 79.
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remedies 0 ' in that: (1) it does not establish any definite time
beyond which further litigation is barred, (2) its application depends on a showing that the state has been prejudiced in its
ability to respond to the petition by delay in filing, (3) it does
not apply if the petitioner raises grounds of which he could not
have had knowledge prior to the prejudicial occurrence by the
exercise of reasonable diligence, and (4) it only provides that a
petition may be dismissed if the foregoing conditions are satisfied. Determining when the claim was reasonably discoverable
and if and when the state was prejudiced can be burdensome
and time-consuming, and the judgmental and unpredictable nature of the determination limits the Rule's utility as a deterrent
to belated filing. On account of the Rule's limitations, it provides no assurance that a petition will be dismissed even in cases
involving enormous delays in filing. 0 5
Rule 9(a) is, however, all that is available in this area at the
present time, and its potential utility has been undermined by a
narrow judicial construction. The Rule identifies prejudice to the
state's "ability to respond to the petition" resulting from delay
as the basis for dismissal. In Aiken v. Spalding,es the court held
that this refers only to the state's ability to respond to the particular claims raised in the petition. Under this interpretation,
the fact that unjustified delay by the petitioner has made it difficult or impossible to re-try him in the event that a writ is
granted cannot be given any weight in applying the Rule. The
same interpretation has been reiterated in other decisions without any independent analysis.""
204. See supra text accompanying notes 115-16.
205. See, e.g., Spalding v. Aiken, 460 U.S. 1093 (1983) (statement of Burger, C.J.,
concerning denial of certiorari); Buchanon v. Mintzes, 734 F.2d 274 (6th Cir. 1984), cert.
dismissed, 471 U.S. 154 (1985); Alexander v. Maryland, 719 F.2d 1241 (4th Cir. 1983).
206. 684 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1982).
207. See Strahan v. Blackburn, 750 F.2d 438, 441 (5th Cir. 1985); Alexander v. Maryland, 719 F.2d 1241, 1247 n.10 (4th Cir. 1983). In Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 264-65
(1986), the Court rejected a suggestion in Justice Powell's dissent that the Court should
create a caselaw rule allowing dismissal of delayed grand jury discrimination claims
where substantial prejudice to the possibility of a retrial has resulted. In discussing this
question the Court noted that a Rule 9(a) dismissal had been denied by the district
court, and stated that "Congress has not seen fit... to provide the State with an additional defense to habeas corpus petitions based on the difficulties that it will face if
forced to retry the defendant." This remark assumed the narrower interpretation of Rule
9(a), but it was evidently based on a facial reading of the Rule, and constituted dictum
on an issue that was not presented in the case. There is no reason to believe that the
Court would regard it as controlling in a case that actually presented the question of
what types of prejudice can be considered in a Rule 9(a) dismissal motion.
In the same context in Hillery, the Court noted that a Judicial Conference advisory
committee had made a proposal, which had not been adopted, to amend Rule 9(a) to
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However, an examination of the relevant legislative history
shows that the state's "response" to the petition can validly be
understood as encompassing retrial of the petitioner in the event
that the petition is granted. The Advisory Committee Note to
the substantially identical and concurrently promulgated Rule
9(a) for section 2255 motion proceedings stated explicitly that
the purpose of the rule was to "prevent movants from withholding their claims so as to prejudice the government both in meeting the allegations of the motion and in any possible retrial"
(emphasis added). 208 The same understanding was implicit in
testimony on behalf of the Judicial Conference before the responsible Congressional committee. 0 9
In rejecting this understanding, the court in Spalding discerned a general hostility on Congress's part to the purposes of
Rule 9(a). In fact, however, Congress rejected arguments raised
at the hearings on the proposed rules that Rule 9(a) should not
be enacted,2 10 and only changed the Rule by deleting two
sentences which would have created a presumption of prejudice
to the government in case a petition was filed after a five-year
period which would normally run from conviction. The legislative history indicates that the reasons for this change were (1) a
concern that the five-year period running from conviction could
expire in some cases before a prisoner was able to exhaust state
remedies, (2) the view that the state is in a better position than
the petitioner to show whether it has been prejudiced by delay,
and (3) the view that the formulation without a definite time
period specification would be consistent with existing law, including the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 that "[a] motion for
state explicitly that dismissal based on prejudice to retrial was permitted, and that Congress had not created a time limit on habeas corpus applications. However, the purpose
of the proposed rule change cited by the Court was to "make clear that the laches principle in [Rule 9(a)] also applies when the state . . .has been prejudiced in its ability to
retry the petitioner." 52 U.S.L.W. 2145 (1983). The notice of this proposed clarification
did not state or suggest that such prejudice could not be considered under a proper
reading of the current Rule. See id. As discussed earlier, the Senate overwhelmingly
passed legislation in 1984 that would have created a definite time limit on habeas applications. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102, 182-85. The failure of the House of
Representatives to pass comparable legislation has no apparent relevance to the interpretation of current Rule 9(a).
208. The Note also quoted passages from judicial opinions which emphasized the
prejudice to the possibility of retrial created by delay in filing.
209. See Habeas Corpus: Hearings on H.R. 15319 before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1976) (illustration of "prejudice" under the Rule by case of prisoner considering delay until unavailability of government witness would prevent new trial and reconviction).
210. See id. at 20-23, 25-27, 29-40, 32-43, 36-37.
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. . . relief may be made at any time."2 " ' None of these reasons
provides a basis for distinguishing between prejudice in meeting
a petitioner's claims and prejudice to the possibility of retrial, or
suggest a legislative purpose to reject the interpretation
presented to Congress in the Advisory Committee's notes.
Thus, a good argument can be made that reading "prejudice"
under the rule to include prejudice to the possibility of retrial is
more consistent with the rule's intended interpretation than the
narrow facial reading adopted in Aiken v. Spalding, as well as
that the interpretation adopted in that decision imposes a limitation on the type of prejudice that can be considered which
makes no sense in principle.21 2

CONCLUSION

In characterizing the development of the current habeas
corpus jurisdiction and the reaction to proposed reforms, Judge
Friendly has observed:
Legal history has many instances where a remedy initially serving a felt need has expanded bit by bit, without
much thought being given to any single step, until it has
assumed an aspect so different from its origin as to demand reappraisal-agonizing or not. That, in my view, is
what has happened with respect to collateral attack on
criminal convictions. After trial, conviction, sentence, appeal, affirmance, and denial of certiorari by the Supreme
Court, in proceedings where the defendant had the assistance of counsel at every step, the criminal process, in
Winston Churchill's phrase, has not reached the end, or
even the beginning of the end, but only the end of the
beginning. Any murmur of dissatisfaction with this situation provokes immediate incantation of the Great Writ,
with the inevitable initial capitals, often accompanied by
a suggestion that the objector is the sort of person who
would cheerfully desecrate the Ark of the Covenant."'
211. See id. at 32-33, 50-52, 107-08, 111-14; H. R. REP. No. 1471, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
4-5 & nn. 8-9, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2478, 2481 & nn.8-9;
122 CONG. REC. 30222-23 (1976); id. at 30758.
212. See Aiken v. Spalding, 684 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1982) (Poole, J., concurring).
213. Friendly, supra note 70, at 142.
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The "felt need" which habeas corpus has served in its historical and constitutional function is one of basic importance in any
civilized system of justice. In its traditional character, it upholds
the rule of law by ensuring that the government cannot detain a
person without specifying the charges against him and bringing
him to trial on those charges.2 1'
In contrast, the current statutory "habeas corpus" remedy by
which lower federal courts review state judgments is simply an
attenuated appellate mechanism by which prisoners who have
already been tried and convicted, and who have unsuccessfully
appealed their convictions (often repeatedly), can re-litigate in
the lower federal courts the same claims that have been rejected
at the various stages of adjudication and review in the state
court systems. This review jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts in state criminal cases is a recent outgrowth-based on
innovative judicial decisions of the 1950s and 1960s-from a
narrow statutory remedy created for completely different purposes in the Reconstruction era. It has no relationship in character or function to the Great Writ whose suspension is prohibited
by the Constitution. They have nothing in common but a
2 15

name.

The resistance to necessary reforms based on confusion between the current statutory "habeas corpus" remedy and the
constitutional writ of habeas corpus is a depressing testament to
the power of terminology to overpower substance and stifle intelligent reflection. Calling a decoy a duck does not make it fly.
Calling the existing review jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts over state judgments "habeas corpus" does not make it
into the Great Writ of the Constitution and the common law.
Putting aside the erroneous identification of the current statutory remedy and the traditional writ of habeas corpus, we see no
reason to retain federal habeas corpus for state prisoners in its
contemporary character. Mandatory review of claims that have
been rejected in earlier appellate proceedings goes beyond any
legitimate interest of fairness to defendants, and the absence of
reasonable time limits and rules against repetitive application
would be dismissed as absurd if suggested in connection with
any other appellate mechanism. There is no reason to believe
that preserving this extraordinary type of review yields any benefits that outweigh its very substantial costs to the interests in
214.
215.

See supra Part I.A.
See supra Parts I.B.-C and Part III.A.
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finality, federalism, and rational application of criminal justice
216
resources.
As suggested by Attorney General William French Smith,
abolishing federal habeas corpus for state prisoners would be the
optimum reform in this area. The Constitution allows this, because the "writ of habeas corpus" it safeguards is unrelated to
the current post-conviction "habeas corpus" remedy, and because its prohibition of suspension of the writ creates no right to
a federal court remedy for persons in state custody. State prisoners would continue to be able to secure review of their cases
following such a reform through the various appellate and collateral review mechanisms provided in the state courts, and would
also retain the traditional right to seek direct review by the Supreme Court.2
Congress has enacted a number of restrictions on federal
habeas corpus for state prisoners which are currently in effect,
and has made substantial moves towards a more complete solution on several occasions. When the first glimmerings of the expansive potential of federal habeas corpus appeared in the late
nineteenth century, Congress reacted with dismay, but deferred
direct corrective action' in the expectation that restoring the Supreme Court's review jurisdiction in habeas corpus cases might
suffice to rein in the lower federal courts.2 18
When the Supreme Court itself began to incline toward increasingly expansive habeas corpus review of state judgments in
the middle part of this century, the Judicial Conference promoted reform legislation whose practical effect would have been
close to abolition. Legislation that was arguably of this character
was enacted in 1948, but the Supreme Court in Brown v. Allen
refused to give it effect in the absence of a clearer expression of
legislative intent. Legislation that was unmistakably of this
character was passed by the House of Representatives in 1956
and again in 1958. Ten years later, legislation that would have
abolished federal habeas corpus for state prisoners reached the
Senate floor as part of the proposed Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968.219
In 1970, in creating the current court system for the District
of Columbia, Congress barred access to federal habeas corpus for
D.C. prisoners. Thus, "although a state prisoner across the Poto216.
217.
218.
219.

See
See
See
See

supra text accompanying notes 103-118, 129-60.
supra Part IV.A.1.
supra text accompanying note 75.
supra text accompanying notes 83-97.
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mac in Virginia, or one over the line in Maryland, has a second
chance for collateral review of his conviction in the federal
courts in those states, a state prisoner in the District of Columbia does not."2 20 No adverse effect on the quality or fairness of
proceedings in D.C. has been observed to result from this
reform. 21
The Supreme Court as well has shown an increasing recognition in recent years of the costs of the existing system of habeas
corpus review, and has adopted a number of limitations on its
scope and availability. However, the potential for reform
through litigation is limited by the constraints of precedent and
existing statutory standards.222
Whether or not a general legislative solution along the lines of
the District of Columbia reform or earlier "abolition" proposals
is practically feasible at the present time, the potential exists for
basic improvements through limited reform legislation addressed to the clearest abuses and excesses of the existing system of habeas corpus review. Legislation of this type was initially proposed by the Justice Department in 1982, and was
passed by the Senate in 1984 by a vote of 67 to 9.223 Substantially the same reform proposals have recently been transmitted
by the President as Title II of the proposed Criminal Justice
Reform Act,22 and now await Congress' action. As Attorney
General Smith observed in 1983:
The writ of habeas corpus that currently burdens state
officials and the federal judiciary, vexes federal-state relations, and defeats the ends of criminal justice is not the
writ of habeas corpus that was esteemed by the founders
of our nation and accorded recognition in the Constitution. The diversion of the Great Writ from its historic
function is the source of its current disrepute and the
problems it has engendered. Its availability, in particular,
to state criminal convicts to challenge their convictions in
federal court may well be an institution whose time has
passed. For the immediate future the best prospect for
meaningful reform lies with the Administration's legislative proposals. These proposals would go far toward correcting the major deficiencies of the present system of
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

McGowan, supra note 173, at
See supra text accompanying
See supra Part II.B and Part
See supra text accompanying
S. 1970 and H.R. 3777.

668.
notes 81-82, 172-73.
IV.B.
notes 98-102, 182-89.
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federal habeas corpus in terms of federalism, proper regard for the stature of the state courts, and the needs of
criminal justice.2 25

225.

Smith, supra note 118, at 153.
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APPENDIX: HABEAS CORPUS CASES

As noted at the start of this Report, the contemporary system
of federal habeas corpus review of state judgments can convert
"the process of review in criminal cases into a kind of interminable game, an open-ended hunt for official error. In this attenuated process the question is not whether an innocent defendant,
mistakenly convicted, may enlist the aid of an appellate court in
correcting a miscarriage of justice. Rather, it is whether a persistent defendant, however guilty, may eventually get lucky and
persuade some judge or court to find error, given unlimited opportunities to do so. ' 2' This appendix describes some particular

cases that illustrate the costs of a system which permits the indefinite continuation of litigation in criminal cases.
1. The Hillery case- On the night of March 21, 1962, fifteen-year-old Marlene Miller was at home alone, sewing a dress
that she expected to wear on her sixteenth birthday. Marlene
never got to wear the dress. On the following morning, her body
was found in an irrigation ditch near her house. She had been
subjected to an attempted rape, and the sewing scissors she had
been using, monogrammed with her name, were embedded up to
the handles in her throat.
Booker Hillery, who was out on parole from an earlier rape
conviction, was arrested for the crime, convicted, and sentenced
to death. Hillery's conviction marked the start of sixteen years
of litigation in the state courts.
The conviction and sentence were initially upheld by the Supreme Court of California on appeal in 1963.27 In 1965, that

court upheld Hillery's conviction again on re-hearing, finding all
his claims to be without merit or non-prejudicial, and characterizing the evidence of guilt as "overwhelming.

'2 28

However, the

jury that sentenced Hillery to death had been given instructions
relating to the possibility of release on parole if a life term was
imposed and the possibility of reduction of the sentence that
were inconsistent with a California Supreme Court decision
226. Assistant Attorney General Stephen J. Markman, Remarks at a Seminar on the
Administration of Justice sponsored by the Brookings Institution, Annapolis, Maryland,
at 1-2 (Mar. 8, 1986).
227. 34 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1963).
228. 62 Cal. 2d 692, 713, 401 P. 2d 382, 395, 44 Cal. Rptr. 30, 43 (1965). Hillery
applied for review of this decision by the United States Supreme Court. The Court denied certiorari. 386 U.S. 938 (1967).
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which followed Hillery's trial and initial appeal. The case was
accordingly remanded for a new penalty trial.22
At the second penalty trial, Hillery was again sentenced to
death, and the sentence was upheld by the California Supreme
Court on appeal in 1967.230 Hillery subsequently filed a petition
for state habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court,
presenting a new challenge to the result of the second penalty
trial. A potential juror had been excused at that trial after she
stated that she thought that she could not sentence anyone to
death in any case or follow state law relating to capital punishment. The California Supreme Court believed that the trial
judge's questioning on this point and the juror's responses were
inadequate under the standard of Witherspoon v. Illinois,2 31 and
232
overturned Hillery's capital sentence again.
This decision in 1969 was followed by a third penalty trial, at
which Hillery was sentenced to death for the third time. He appealed to the California Supreme Court, raising various claims
attacking his conviction and sentence. In 1974, that court affirmed the conviction again, but the sentence was changed to life
imprisonment on the basis of a 1972 California Supreme Court
decision holding capital punishment to be inconsistent with the
state constitution. That decision had been promptly overturned
through amendment of the state constitution by initiative, but
this change was deemed too late to affect Hillery's case.233 In
1978, Hillery engaged in a final round of state habeas corpus litigation which terminated with the denial of his petition by the
23 4
California Supreme Court.
The conclusion of sixteen years of state court litigation in Hillery's case was, to borrow Judge Friendly's phrase, only "the end
of the beginning. '3 86 Later in 1978, he filed a petition for habeas
corpus in federal district court, alleging that blacks had been intentionally excluded from the grand jury that indicted him in
1962. This issue had been raised, prior to Hillery's initial trial,
before the state superior court judge responsible for grand jury
selection (Judge Wingrove). There had been no blacks on the
seven grand juries selected by that judge, though blacks consti229. 62 Cal. 2d at 697, 713, 401 P. 2d at 384-85, 395, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 32-33, 43.
230. 65 Cal. 2d 795, 423 P: 2d 208, 56 Cal. Rptr. 280, cert. denied, 386 U.S. 938
(1967).
231. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
232. 71 Cal. 2d 857, 457 P. 2d 565, 79 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1969).
233. 10 Cal. 3d 897, 519 P. 2d 572, 112 Cal. Rptr. 524 (en banc) (1974).
234. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 256 & n.2, 279 n.10 (1986); id., Brief for
Petitioner at 5-6 and Brief for Respondent at 3.
235. Friendly, supra note 70, at 142.
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tuted about 5 percent of the county's population in the relevant
period, and blacks had served on trial juries. In ruling on a motion to quash the indictment, Judge Wingrove denied that the
absence of blacks on the grand juries he had selected was the
result of discrimination, and stated that he had made unsuccessful efforts to identify qualified blacks for grand jury service. In
particular, he had previously asked Hillery's lawyer (who was
black) to identify such persons, and had considered selecting a
particular black resident of the county for grand jury service,
but declined to do so after determining that it would interfere
with the prospective juror's regular employment. Judge Wingrove's rejection of this discrimination claim was affirmed by the
California Supreme Court on appeal. The discrimination claim
was later rejected again in state habeas corpus proceedings."3 6
Hillery's federal habeas corpus petition re-presenting this
claim was litigated over a period of five years before the district
court. 1 s7 In 1983, the district court finally reached the merits of
the claim and granted the writ. The evidence before the court
included the records of state proceedings; testimony given in the
federal proceedings by Hillery's former lawyer in support of the
claim that he had unsuccessfully litigated in the state courts
twenty years earlier; and a statistical analysis of grand jury selection in Kings County up to the time of Hillery's case. Judge
Wingrove was not available to testify in response to the charge
that he had engaged in intentional discrimination on the basis of
race, having died many years before the federal proceedings.
In granting the writ, the district court identified as supporting
evidence the absence of blacks on grand juries although blacks
constituted about 4.6% of the adult population in the county,2 38
Judge Wingrove's knowledge that his standards for grand jury
service did not result in any blacks being selected, 89 the subjec236. See 386 P.2d at 486-87; 401 P.2d at 392-93; and sources cited in note 234 supra.
237. 496 F. Supp. 632 (E.D. Cal. 1980); 533 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Cal. 1982); 563 F.
Supp. 1228 (E.D. Cal. 1983).
238. Much of the district court's opinion was devoted to a statistical analysis supporting the conclusion that the absence of blacks on grand juries "was unlikely to be due
solely to chance or accident," assuming random selection from the general adult population. 563 F. Supp. at 1241-46. This point, however, was of slight relevance to the ultimate
issue in the case, since the grand jury selection process was not random. The question
presented was whether the statistical disparity resulted from non-racial conditions on
service in an obviously non-random selection process, as opposed to the deliberate exclusion of potential grand jurors on the basis of race.
239. The district court made the stronger assertion that Judge Wingrove continued
to select only persons meeting his standards "with full knowledge that such action would
mean that no blacks would serve." 563 F. Supp. at 1247. However, the basis for this
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tive nature of the selection process, 4 ' and the fact that Judge
Wingrove did select a black person to serve on a grand jury in
the year following Hillery's indictment." The court refused to
credit Judge Wingrove's explanation of his actions in the state
record and also discounted the state's explanation that the
county's black residents were largely engaged in itinerant
farmwork and would have suffered economic hardship from
grand jury service.2"' The district court's decision was affirmed
by the Ninth Circuit on appeal in 1984.2 3
The state applied for certiorari to the Supreme Court, and the
Court granted review.2 44 The Court upheld the granting of the

writ, emphasizing that a finding of racial discrimination in grand
jury selection has traditionally been grounds for reversing a conviction, and rejecting the idea of creating a limitation on the
assertion was not explained, and Judge Wingrove did select a black grand juror in the
following year. 563 F. Supp. at 1248.
240. The district court dismissed as irrelevant Judge Wingrove's explanation in the
state record that grand juries in Kings County rarely considered criminal matters, and
primarily performed a watchdog function with respect to the operations of county government. 563 F. Supp. 1233, 1250. However, this point was relevant as support for a nondiscriminatory purpose behind a practice of using certain judgmental standards in selecting grand jurors. In relation to a body whose essential function was oversight of county
government, it was not unreasonable to want to choose "people who are interested in the
community, civic minded, the better type of our citizens" and "someone who has some
substance, some interest in government, some interest in community activities, civil activities, people that take an interest that way." 563 F. Supp. at 1232 (quoting Judge
Wingrove's explanation of selection standards). See generally JA-33 and Brief for Petitioner at 38-40, Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (description of grand jury functions and statutory conditions on service).
241. Judge Wingrove's selection of a black grand juror was cited by the district court
as evidence that he had intentionally excluded blacks from grand juries on the ground
that it evidenced a change from prior practice after the discrimination issue was raised in
Hillery's case. 563 F. Supp. at 1248-49. One wonders what would have happened if Judge
Wingrove had not subsequently selected any black grand jurors. Presumably that would
also have been cited as additional evidence supporting the discrimination claim.
242. Cf. L.A. Times, Jan. 20, 1986 ("Raymond Niday, 63, a Lemoore insurance man
who was foreman of the grand jury that indicted Hillery. . .said . . . that economics,
not race, was the governing factor in selecting grand jury members: 'Three classes of
people served on the grand juries, a businessman able to sustain his family whether he
worked on a day-to-day basis or not, a retired person or a housewife. Farm laborers,
wage earners, blue collar people could not afford to serve on grand juries. You would
have created a hell of an imposition on any person in those categories. They had to be
out earning their living. . . .Blacks at that time in this county were at the lower end of
the economic scale, just as many whites were. If a person had the ability to [participate],
he or she would never have been excluded. . . .The evidence was totally overwhelming
against Hillery. We had no other alternative but to indict him. . . .The court's decision
(overturning Hillery's conviction) is a travesty, transposing an incident that happened
nearly a quarter of a century ago into the present day. . . .The futility of it all upsets
me.' ").

243.
244.

733 F. 2d 644 (9th Cir. 1984).
474 U.S. 254 (1986).
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raising of such claims on review in light of prejudice to the
state's ability to re-try the petitioner. Justice Powell, joined in
dissent by Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger, stated:
Respondent, a black man, was indicted by a grand jury
having no black members for the stabbing murder of a
15-year-old girl. A petit jury found respondent guilty of
that charge beyond a reasonable doubt, in a trial the fairness of which is unchallenged here. Twenty-three years
later, we are asked to grant respondent's petition for a
writ of habeas corpus-and thereby require a new trial if
that is still feasible-on the ground that blacks were purposefully excluded from the grand jury that indicted him.
It is undisputed that race discrimination has long since
disappeared from the grand jury selection process in
Kings County, California. It is undisputed that a grand
jury that perfectly represented Kings County's population at the time of respondent's indictment would have
contained only one black member. Yet the Court holds
that respondent's petition must be granted, and that respondent must be freed unless the State is able to reconvict, more than two decades after the murder that led to
his incarceration.
It is difficult to reconcile this result with a rational system of justice.
The dissent went on to argue that the establishment of Hillery's guilt by proof beyond a reasonable doubt at a fair trial
demonstrated that he had not been prejudiced in any legally relevant sense by discrimination in the selection of the grand jury,
and that permitting such a non-guilt-related claim to be litigated indefinitely-despite substantial prejudice to the possibility of retrial-goes beyond what is reasonably warranted for deterring discriminatory practices.2 4
245. Id. at 267, 282-83; cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b) and advisory committee note (challenges to grand jury selection waived if not raised before trial); Assistant Att'y General
Stephen J. Markman, Remarks at a Seminar on the Administration of Justice sponsored
by the Brookings Institution, Annapolis, Maryland, at 4 (Mar. 8, 1986) ("[Iln Vasquez v.
Hillery . . . the conviction of the defendant for murdering a fifteen-year-old girl was
reversed after twenty-three years of. . . litigation on grounds of discrimination in the
selection of the grand jury. . . despite the absence of any unfairness -in the defendant's
trial . . . .As the dissenting Justices noted, '[i]t
is difficult to reconcile this result with a
rational system of justice.' No purpose of affording justice to the individual defendant
can explain it, since there is no reason to believe that his conviction was anything other
than accurate and just. Nor can it be explained in terms of providing a systemic deterrent to the specific evil for which relief was granted. Allowing defendants to challenge
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The Supreme Court's decision meant that the state would either have to release Hiliery or give him a new trial, although
there was no reason to doubt the accuracy of his conviction in
1963 for murdering Marlene Miller. The impact of the Court's
decision on the victim's community and family was described as
follows in a Time Magazine article entitled "Seeing Justice
Never Done":
Hanford, California, is a farm community, the kind of
place where people know each other by name and trust
each other by nature. "You can go downtown without a
dime in your pocket, do your shopping and come back to
pay later," says City Councilman J. Brent Madill. .

.

.In

any town, the brutal killing of a teenage girl leaves a
deep mark, but in Hanford the wound remains, 24 years
after the crime. And now the U.S. Supreme Court has
rubbed the wound open again all these years later ...
"Where's the justice?" asks Councilman Madill. "Is
there any justice?" Most of Hanford believes little attention was given to deterring the larger evil ....
Neighbors say that Marlene's parents, now in their
70's, dread the possible reopening of the case. They still
reside in Hanford, though the house they lived in at the
time of their daughter's death has long since been torn
down. The memories have been harder to demolish. "The
sad thing is that it keeps coming back," says Marlene's
brother Walter Jr. "We have not been allowed the time
to heal." And the end is still not in sight."'
The state authorities resolved to re-try Hillery, though doing
so presented extraordinary difficulties after the lapse of a quarter of a century. Six thousand pages of transcripts from earlier
proceedings had to be reviewed. A number of key witnesses from
the original trial were dead; locating surviving witnesses and
other persons with relevant knowledge involved tracking down
the grand jury selection process for some reasonable time would suffice to deter such
wrongs. Allowing them to do so forever is irrational and absurd.").
246. TIME MAGAZINE, Feb. 17, 1986, at 73, col. 1. See L.A. Times, Nov. 17, 1986 at 3,
col. 5 ("A trial that takes place so many years after the original crime only 'causes the
victims more suffering,' said Bernard Miller, the uncle of the slain girl. The family spent
a lifetime trying to forget a tragedy, he said, and now they are forced to remember. . ..
'My brother and his wife were terribly traumatized,' he said. 'They've tried to live with it
and get on with their lives. But how can they when the courts keep tossing it back at
them? They're going to have to go back in that courtroom and relive the thing all over
again.' ").
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about 115 people throughout the country. At the original trial,
Hillery was discredited through the admission of false alibi
statements that he made to the police following his arrest; these
statements were ruled inadmissible at the retrial because the police had not observed restrictions on custodial questioning which
emerged in subsequent judicial decisions."" Hillery's testimony
from the 1963 trial was also excluded. 248 However, physical evidence had been retained from the original trial on account of
Hillery's reputation as a persistent litigator, and additional evidence was generated from this material through the use of contemporary forensic technology. The loss of witnesses was partially offset in some instances by having proxies read transcripts
of their testimony from earlier proceedings at the second trial.
On December 18, 1986, Hillery was again convicted of murdering Marlene Miller in 1962, and sentenced to life imprisonment.
Re-trying Hillery had cost the county over $250,000. Within
hours of the conviction, a notice of appeal was filed with the
California Court of Appeal; Hillery's appeal is now pending
2
before that court. And the end is still not in sight. ,
2. The Aiken case- Arthur Aiken and Antonio Wheat
robbed gas stations and killed the attendants. Following their
third robbery and murder within a single month in 1965, they
were apprehended by the police.
Aiken was advised of his rights after being taken into custody.
He was initially unwilling to talk to the police when questioned,
and stated repeatedly during a brief portion of the interrogation
247. In Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964), the Court held that statements obtained from a suspect in custodial interrogation could not be used at trial if the
suspect had requested and been denied counsel and had not been told that he had a
right to remain silent. The Supreme Court of California, in addressing one of Hillery's
appeals in 1965, had held that the questioning of Hillery violated Escobedo and a related
state decision because the police had not told Hillery that he had a right to counsel and
a right to remain silent. 401 P.2d at 382, 384, 394. Of course no such requirement existed
when Hillery was questioned in 1962, see REPORT No. 1, supra note 5, Parts I.B.2.a.-b,
Part I.B.3.a & Part II.A.2.a, and the California Supreme Court found in its 1965 decision
that the admission of Hillery's pretrial statements at his trial was harmless error "in
light of the other overwhelming evidence of guilt." 401 P.2d at 394-95. However, the 1965
finding that the admission of Hillery's statements was improper was deemed to be "the
law of the case" and sufficient to require their exclusion at his second trial in 1986.
248. Hillery's testimony at the original trial included a reiteration of his pretrial alibi
story-which was shown to be false by other evidence-and also brought out the fact
that he had a prior rape conviction. 386 P.2d at 481-82; 401 P.2d at 395. These facts were
concealed from the jury at the retrial in 1986.
249. See L.A. Times, Dec. 19, 1986 at 3, col. 1; Dec. 3, 1986 at 33, col. 1; Nov. 25, 1986
at 3, col. 5; and Nov. 17, 1986 at 3, col. 1. Additional information concerning the retrial
and subsequent proceedings was provided by Robert Maline, the Kings County District
Attorney who prosecuted the retrial, Ronald Fahey, who served as special prosecutor in
connection with the retrial, and the Kings County Auditor's office.
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that he wanted a lawyer and did not want to say anything. However, after Aiken was confronted with his accomplice Wheat's
refusal to retract statements which imputed primary responsibility for one of the killings to Aiken, he became eager to give his
version of the crimes, and provided detailed confessions which
inculpated him in two of the murders. At trial, Aiken was convicted of three counts of murder and sentenced to death.8 0
The conviction was appealed to the Supreme Court of Washington, which remanded the case for additional fact-finding concerning the propriety of admitting Aiken's confessions. The trial
court concluded that the confessions had been properly admitted, and the state supreme court, agreeing, upheld the judgment."8 '
In reaching this result, the court noted that continued questioning following a request for counsel or an expression of unwillingness to talk is inconsistent with the restrictions on custodial questioning created by Miranda v. Arizona.2 52 However, in
light of Johnson v. New Jersey, " Miranda did not apply retroactively to cases, like Aiken's, in which the trial preceded the
Miranda decision.
The court also rejected arguments2 " that Aiken's confession
was involuntary or inconsistent with the more limited restrictions on interrogation announced by the Supreme Court in the
decision of Escobedo v. Illinois.2' 6 The trial court had found that
Aiken did not confess because of overreaching by the police, but
out of a desire to rebut his accomplice's statements portraying
Aiken as the main actor in one of the killings. The trial court
also found that the officers conducting the interrogation-which
was taperecorded-did not hear Aiken's remarks about wanting
a lawyer or being unwilling to talk. The grounds for this conclusion included the denial of all officers involved that they had
heard such statements; the fact that Aiken "held his head down
• . . spoke softly, slurred his words, and . . . let his voice trial
off"; interference by numerous noises from outside with audibility in the interview room; the distance of the interviewing officers from Aiken; and the great difficulty of hearing on the tape
250. See State v. Aiken, 72 Wash. 2d 306, 434 P.2d 10 (1967).
251. The court also rejected various other claims raised by Aiken, including claims
relating to pretrial publicity, denial of severance, admission of evidence, and jury instructions. 434 P.2d at 35-40.
252. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
253. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
254. 434 P.2d at 21-22.
255. 434 P.2d at 22-24, 31-34.
256. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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many of Aiken's answers-including the disputed statements-as a result of which the trial court did "not believe that
the interrogating officers heard, nor could possibly . . . have
25 7
heard, any request for an attorney or desire to remain silent.
Following the affirmance of Aiken's conviction by the Washington Supreme Court in 1967, he applied to the United States
Supreme Court for review. The Court granted certiorari,25 vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the state courts
for reconsideration in light of the decision in Witherspoon v. Illinois 259 regarding exclusion of potential jurors who oppose the
death penalty, and the decision in Bruton v. United States,6 0
regarding the admission in a joint trial of a co-defendant's confession which implicates the defendant.
On remand, the Washington Supreme Court reaffirmed the
conviction and sentence in 1969, finding that the state procedures followed in Aiken's trial had been consistent with the new
constitutional rules that were subsequently announced in
Witherspoon and Bruton.2 1 The United States Supreme Court
disagreed on the Witherspoon issue, and overturned Aiken's
death sentence in 1971.262 On remand, Aiken was re-sentenced
to three consecutive life terms.
Aiken's case was then quiet for eight years. In 1979, however,
he filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court.
The district court dismissed the petition on grounds of delay in
filing under Rule 9(a) of the habeas corpus procedural rules. A
panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for findings on the issue of whether
the state had been prejudiced by Aiken's delay. The district
court found prejudice to the possibility of re-trying Aiken and
dismissed the petition a second time under Rule 9(a). The court
of appeals, in 1982, then reversed the second dismissal, holding
that prejudice to the possibility of retrial can never be grounds
for a Rule 9(a) dismissal. 6
The state applied to the Supreme Court for review, and the
Court denied certiorari in 1983. In a statement concerning the
denial of certiorari, Chief Justice Burger observed:
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

434 P.2d at 27-33.
392 U.S. 652 (1968).
391 U.S. 510 (1968).
391 U.S. 123 (1968).
75 Wash. 2d 421, 452 P.2d 232 (1969).
403 U.S. 946 (1971).
684 F.2d 632 (1982); see supra text accompanying notes 203-12.
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The time has come to consider limitations on the availability of the writ of habeas corpus in federal courts, especially for prisoners pressing stale claims that were fully
ventilated in state courts. .

.

. The astonishing facts un-

derlying this petition are illustrative and instructive.
On October 14, 1965, a jury .

.

. found Arthur Aiken

and his codefendant guilty of murder in the first degree
for the robbery and slayings of three gas station attendants ... . On direct appeal, Aiken advanced numerous
challenges to his conviction. Following a remand to the
trial court, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction and the sentence .

. .

. On petition for certio-

rari to this court, the conviction was vacated and the case
remanded for reconsideration .

. .

. After a second peti-

tion for certiorari, the conviction was again vacated and
remanded .

. .

. The state trial court then resentenced

Aiken to three consecutive life prison terms.
On July 26, 1979, fourteen years after his original conviction and eight years after his resentencing, Aiken filed
this [habeas corpus] petition .

. .

. He raised claims con-

cerning pretrial publicity, the voluntariness of his confession, and the trial court's failure to grant severance-all
claims that had been raised and decided.

. .

in his first

appeal to the Washington Supreme Court. ...
On February 22, 1980, the District Court denied the
habeas petition .

.

. [under] .-. . Habeas Corpus Rule

9(a). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that prejudice may not be presumed. On
remand, the state presented evidence that it could locate
only 30 of the 87 witnesses who testified at trial and that
136 of the State's 138 exhibits were lost or destroyed.
Finding that the evidence demonstrated that it would be
difficult to retry Aiken.
missed the petition . .

. the District Court again dis. The Court of Appeals for the

.
.

Ninth Circuit again reversed, reasoning that Rule 9(a) allows consideration only of the State's difficulty in "respond[ing] to the [habeas] petition," and not consideration of the difficulty in retrying the petitioner.2
Following the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in 1983, the
case was returned to the district court, which reached a decision
on Aiken's petition in 1985. That court observed:
264.

460 U.S. 1093-96 (1983) (citations and footnotes omitted).
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Aiken's conviction, which will soon reach its twentieth
anniversary, has been before the [state] trial court twice,
the Supreme Court of Washington four times, the Supreme Court of the United States three times, the United
States Court of Appeals twice, and is before this court for
the third time. " 5
The district court rejected all of Aiken's claims on the merits
including the claim that admission of his confessions violated his
rights under the sixth, fifth, and fourteenth amendments.
On the sixth amendment issue, the district court deferred to
the state trial court's determination that the interviewing officers had not heard Aiken's requests for counsel, finding it to be
fairly supported by the record. While the result reached on this
claim was correct, the district court's reliance on the state
court's findings and rationale was unnecessary. The sixth
amendment right to counsel cannot attach before a defendant is
formally charged with a crime or initially brought into court. "6
Since these events had not occurred at the time of Aiken's interrogation, 6 his rights under the sixth amendment were not violated even if the officers did hear his requests for counsel. 6
On the question of the voluntariness of Aiken's confession
(the fifth and fourteenth amendment issue), the district court
found-like the state courts almost twenty years earlier-that
Aiken had not confessed because of police coercion, but in order
to respond to his accomplice Wheat's effort to shift most of the
blame to Aiken. The district court also found the case to be indistinguishable from Frazier v. Cupp 2 6 -another case involving
a post-Escobedo but pre-Miranda interrogation-in which the
Supreme Court upheld the admission of a confession obtained
through continued questioning after the defendant had expressed a desire to talk to a lawyer.
265. The opinion generated in the district court was a magistrate's report that was
approved and adopted by the court. Aiken v. Spalding, Report and Recommendation in
Case No. C79-892R (W.D. Wash., June 14, 1985); Judgment of District Court in Case No.
C79-892R (W.D. Wash., Sept. 5, 1985). References to the statements and reasoning of
the "district court" refer to the magistrate's report.
266. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428-32 (1986).
267. 434 P.2d at 14-15, 27-29, 54.
268. The principal case establishing that the sixth amendment right to counsel cannot attach prior to formal accusation came after the district court's decision. Moran v.
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986). The Supreme Court had previously taken the same position in different factual settings in United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984), and
the plurality opinion in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
269. 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
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Aiken appealed the district court's denial of the writ to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. A panel of the Ninth Circuit, in
1988, then dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust state
remedies, although Aiken had previously litigated all of his
claims in state court and the state had conceded before the district court that state remedies were exhausted. ° In the district
court proceedings, Aiken had presented new evidence in support
of his confession claim-specifically, a sound expert's enhancement and analysis of the taperecording-which had not been
presented to the state courts. The panel believed that this evidence "substantially improves the evidentiary basis for Aiken's
right-to-counsel and voluntariness arguments," and accordingly
should be considered in the first instance in the state courts.7 1
Thus, nine years of federal habeas corpus litigation-following
six years of state and federal litigation on direct review and
eight years of pure delay-failed to produce a federal court resolution of the merits of the claims raised in Aiken's petition. If
his claims are again presented to and rejected by the state
courts, he will then be free to commence another round of
habeas corpus litigation in the lower federal courts.
3. The Witt Case- On October 28, 1973, Johnny Witt was
out bow and arrow hunting with a younger friend, Gary Tillman.
The two men had spoken on other occasions about killing a
human, and had stalked persons like animal prey. On that day,
they waylaid 11 year old Jonathan Kushner as he rode his bicycle along a path through a wooded area. Tillman struck
Jonathan on the head with a star bit from a drill. Witt and Tillman then wrestled the struggling boy to the ground, bound and
gagged him, and placed him in the trunk of Witt's car. They
drove to a deserted grove and discovered when they opened the
trunk that the victim had died by suffocating from the gag.
They then "dug a grave for the Kushner boy and . . . slit his

stomach so it would not bloat. Before burying the victim, Witt
270. Aiken v. Spalding, 841 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1988).
271. For reasons suggested in the textual discussion of the district court's decision,
this conclusion was unwarranted. See supra text accompanying notes 266-69. Even if the
"new evidence" did establish that the officers heard Aiken's requests for counsel, there
could be no sixth amendment violation, since adversarial judicial proceedings had not
commenced at the time of his interrogation. Both the district court and the state courts
also made determinations that rebutted Aiken's involuntariness claim and that were independent of the question whether the officers had heard his statements (specifically, the
finding that Aiken's confession resulted from a desire to refute his accomplice's accusation rather than from any misconduct by the police). Prior assessment of the "new evidence" by the state courts is unnecessary because-even taken for all it might be
worth-it would not entitle Aiken to relief on his confession claim.

1002

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 22:3 & 4

and Tillman performed various
acts of sexual perversion and vi'7
olence to Kushner's body.'

Witt was turned in to the sheriff's department by his wife, and
gave a detailed confession to the crime following his arrest. At
trial, he was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. The
Supreme Court of Florida upheld the conviction and sentence on
appeal in 1977.'7 8 The United States Supreme Court denied
7
certiorari.' '

Witt then applied for post-conviction relief in the state trial
court. The application was denied, and the Florida Supreme
court affirmed the denial in 1980. The court noted that "Witt
raises essentially six issues, all of which he admits either were
raised in the direct appeal from his conviction and sentence, or
could have been raised at that time." The court went on to find
that alleged changes in caselaw subsequent to Witt's initial appeal were insufficient to justify the relitigation or belated raising
of these claims.'

75

27 6

The United States Supreme Court again de-

nied certiorari.
In 1980, Witt applied for habeas corpus in federal district
court. The district court denied the writ. On appeal, a panel of
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the rejection of
most of Witt's claims, but concluded that the writ should be
granted on the basis of improper exclusion of a potential juror.
The specific claim was that three prospective jurors who opposed capital punishment had been excused on inadequate
grounds. The defense had raised no objection to excusing these
individuals during jury selection in 1974, and the same type of
claim had been rejected by the Supreme Court of Florida in
Witt's initial appeal. Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit focused
on one prospective juror who was excused after she indicated
that she was opposed to capital punishment and that her death
penalty beliefs would interfere with her sitting as a juror and
judging the guilt or innocence of the defendant. This was
deemed improper under the standards of Witherspoon v. llinois,'" and resulted in the overturning of Witt's sentence by the
federal appellate panel in 1983.278
272. Witt v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1069, 1071 (11th Cir. 1983); Wainwright v. Witt,
469 U.S. 412, 414 (1985); Witt v. State, 342 So.2d 497, 499 (Fla. 1977).
273. 342 So.2d 497 (Fla. 1977).
274. 434 U.S. 935 (1977); 434 U.S. 1026 (1978).
275. 387 So.2d 922 (Fla. 1980).
276. 449 U.S. 1067 (1980).
277. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
278. 714 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1983).
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the granting of the writ in 1985.279 The Court held that excusing a potential juror is proper if his views on capital punishment would substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror, and
that a state court determination that a potential juror is so biased is entitled to a presumption of correctness under the standards of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The Supreme Court's decision on January 21, 1985, reinstating Witt's capital sentence was followed by the usual last-minute
flurry of applications seeking to prevent or delay the execution
of the sentence. Witt unsuccessfully applied for post-conviction
relief in the state trial court, alleging ineffective assistance of
trial counsel and re-presenting on a different theory his earlier
objection to the exclusion of certain prospective jurors who opposed capital punishment. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the denial of relief.2 80 The court found that the belated
raising of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim was an
abuse of procedure in light of the decision of Witt's attorney not
to raise such a claim in the first state post-conviction proceeding, and also rejected the claim on the merits. The court similarly found that the belated raising of the revised juror-exclusion
claim was unjustified and also noted that the theory underlying
the claim had been rejected in earlier decisions.
Witt applied for habeas corpus and a stay of execution in federal district court, presenting the same ineffectiveness of counsel
and juror-exclusion claims. The district court dismissed the petition as an abuse of the writ and denied a certificate of probable
cause for appeal on March 1, 1985. The Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the denial of a stay and a certificate of probable cause on March 4, 1985, agreeing that the petition was an
abuse of the writ and finding that it presented no substantial
ground upon which relief might be granted. 28 1 The Supreme
Court denied an application for a stay of execution, denied certiorari, and denied a petition for rehearing of the denial of certiorari and a stay of execution on March 5, 1985.282 On March 6,
1985, after eleven years of litigation, Witt's death sentence for
murdering Jonathan Kushner was finally carried out.

279.
280.
281.
282.

469
465
755
470

U.S. 412 (1985).
So.2d 510 (Fla. 1985).
F.2d 1396 (11th Cir. 1985).
U.S. 1039, 1046 (1985).

